



SOUTH AUSTRALIA POLICE
KEEPING SA SAFE

District Policing Model Stage 1

Audit

u p r e b t e e a i n P o r m o a d



**Government
of South Australia**

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****Appendix 1 & 2 are separate documents to this report****

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Audit has analysed documentation and consulted with relevant internal stakeholders. The Terms of Reference were the guiding principles for work conducted during the Audit.

The Structure and Full Time Establishment (FTE) of each District, the State Crime Assessment Centre (SCAC), the Investigation Support Desk (ISD) and the State Response Manager (SRM) were analysed as part of this Audit.

There were some changes in the structure of the Districts; however they were generally structured as per the District Policing Model (DPM). Changes have been made to assist in the management of property. A Northern Property Store has not been established, impacting Northern and Western District. Eastern District has been utilising staff to manage property at Holden Hill. 2 FTE will be deleted from Holden Hill and created in Southern Property when property transitions from Holden Hill to the Southern Property Store.

Southern Child and Family Investigation Section (CFIS) are trialling an "allocation and assessment" team due to the volume of Domestic Abuse Crime Occurrences that are required to be assessed and allocated by District CFIS Supervisors. The number of Community Constables in some Districts has increased, resulting in changes to structure. Other changes that have been made by Districts include the expansion of Missing Persons Units (Southern District) and the expansion of Neighbourhood Policing Teams or the development of operations with the same effect and purpose (Western and Eastern District respectively).

The management of enquiries conducted by Patrols throughout the Districts was structured differently, with varying amounts of staff used to complete this function. It is recommended a decision is made by Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan Operations Service (ACMOS) as to how these enquiries are allocated.

An over establishment of staff throughout MOS of 159.72 FTE (as of the 22nd February 2019) has allowed for increased flexibility in staffing throughout the Districts, particularly in Southern and Eastern District, and absorbed the impact of vacancies. As these positions diminish, changes in structure will have an increased impact on work areas if they are maintained.

The structure and FTE of the SCAC, ISD and SRM is consistent with the DPM. Secondments and absence have negatively impacted the SRM position. Since the commencement of this audit, staffing within the SCAC has been increased with 5 OE positions created and OR's seconded in for 6 months.

The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of the Crime Co-ordination Section (CCS), Operations Coordination Section (OCS), SCAC, ISD and SRM were analysed as part of this Audit.

There were instances of non-compliance with the SOP in both the CCS and OCS throughout the Districts. There were also inconsistencies in operation between areas within CCS and OCS throughout the Districts. Recommendations have been made to address issues of non-compliance with the SOP's and inconsistencies in operations. The development of prescriptive SOP's relevant to each area within the CCS and OCS will ensure best practice is utilised across the Districts, improve efficiency in operation and ensure consistency.

The ISD were, in general, complying with their SOP. They are limited in their capacity to comply with components of their SOP due to resourcing and technological support. The ISD provide a high quality service and layer of risk mitigation by providing information regarding current incidents and are a valuable source of information for the SRM and SSM. Due to the limited information available to them, they are not regularly and consistently identifying pattern crime as it occurs. Investment in technological support to the ISD will assist in their ability to identify pattern crime and better inform the SRM and SSM. Task creep should be monitored within the ISD to ensure their capacity to monitor current events is retained.

The SCAC are processing occurrences, however, they not consistently and rigorously assessing crime as per the SOP and as intended under the DPM. As the SCAC is centralised, their non-compliance in this aspect of the SOP has broad impacts throughout the organisation and the predicted level of assessment and reduction of workload for the frontline has yet to be realised. Districts are utilising staff to try and rectify these issues. Shield has had a significant impact on the SCAC and the wider organisation. The impact of Shield, an inability to effectively monitor and manage the performance of members of the SCAC, a lack of direct management, training and insufficient, measurable Key Performance Indicators are factors that were identified as part of this audit that have contributed to the SCAC not consistently and rigorously assessing reported crime. Recommendations have been made in this audit to address these factors, improve service delivery and drive consistency in line with their SOP.

The functions of the SRM and SSM are being completed as per the SOP as all of the responsibilities listed can be completed by either role. The concept of actively moving resources based on demand by the SRM has not been realised, with limited technological support to make decisions and the movement of resources happening irregularly. There is duplication in the work completed by the SRM and SSM and high absenteeism rates of the SRM from the role have resulted in the SSM conducting the functions of both roles on many occasions. Recommendations have been made to address the issues identified. An accurate assessment of this role cannot be made unless it is fully implemented and staffed as intended with improved technological support to assist decision making.

All recommendations made as a result of this audit have been made with a focus on driving consistency throughout the Districts and Communication Group, efficiently using resources and utilising technology to improve service delivery in line with the terms of reference.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

On 29th January 2019 Assistant Commissioner Bamford provided approval for an Audit to be conducted on specific parts of the District Policing Model Stage 1. The Project sponsors were Assistant Commissioner Bamford and Assistant Commissioner Dickson.

The Terms of Reference of this audit were endorsed by the Operations Program Board on the 11th February 2019.

The Audit was to undertake the following:

1. Undertake an audit of structure and FTE allocation relative to:
 - a. Each District;
 - b. State Response Manager;
 - c. The State Crime Assessment Centre;
 - d. The Investigation Support Desk.
2. Undertake an audit of the Standard Operating Procedures for the following:
 - a. Each District Crime Coordination Section;
 - b. Each District Operations Coordination Section;
 - c. State Response Manager;
 - d. The State Crime Assessment Centre;
 - e. Investigation Support Desk.

The Auditing Officer prepared a Commissioners Briefing Paper detailing the **methodology** to be utilised to conduct the audit which was approved by the Project Manager, Superintendent John De Candia. *This is attached as Appendix 8.* 98 stakeholders from the relevant areas were interviewed and further data gathered to conduct the audit.

AUDIT OF STRUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION.

1. Each District

A summary of changes to structure is included in each Appendix under the relevant District. There are 3 tables included for each of the Districts. The first table shows a summary of the FTE in the District and includes changes to structure as of the 22nd February 2019. The second table shows the allocated staffing as per the DPM Stage 1 with alterations made for changes to station staffing. The third table was completed by the Workforce Planners within each District in consultation with managers from the District and displays the actual staffing throughout the District on the 11th February 2019, breaking down the location of each particular rank within the District. The figures in the third table are not exact as during this period all positions had not been altered on Chris 21 to cater for the station changes.

Appendix 1A: Southern District Structure and FTE Allocation.

Appendix 1B: Eastern District Structure and FTE Allocation.

Appendix 1C: Northern District Structure and FTE Allocation.

Appendix 1D: Western District Structure and FTE Allocation.

Each District has an FTE allocation that is consistent with the District Policing Model Stage 1. There is, however, a large number of over establishment (OE) positions within the Districts, particularly in Southern District (61.60 positions) and Eastern District (51.52 positions). These positions offset the overall vacancies including secondments out, long term absences, vacancies and loss of FTE due to Part Time Agreements. FTE is lost through Part Time Agreements where a position is not job shared effectively, therefore not utilising the full FTE of the position. The total FTE lost due to Part Time Agreements across the Districts was 22.19 FTE.

A consistent change in structure amongst all of the Districts is the loss of General Duties members to cover duties relating to Property Management, with Southern District (1 FTE – Seconded to Southern Property Store), Eastern District (3.63 FTE – to manage property within the District), Northern District (5 FTE – to manage property at Elizabeth) and Western District (3 FTE – to manage property at Port Adelaide). This is due to there being no Northern Property Store (effecting Northern and Western Districts). Since the audit was conducted issues surrounding staff managing property from Grenfell Street Station in Eastern District have been resolved and the 1 FTE has been returned to normal duties.

Holden Hill were originally to be serviced by the Northern Property Store. Under the DPM Holden Hill are part of Eastern District. A decision has been made for Holden Hill Property to be managed by the Southern Property Store. When this transition occurs, 2 FTE will be deleted from Holden Hill Response and 2 FTE created in the Southern Property Store. The transition of these positions is expected to take place in June 2019.

It was not dictated under the DPM Stage 1 as to how investigations/enquiries that are not the responsibility of CIB would be investigated by Patrols. The enquiries are allocated by the DAM. The method behind this allocation varies between Districts. Enquiries include Summons and Intervention Order Service, Operation Secure Checks, ACORN and Crime Occurrence Investigations. Under the DPM Stage 2 it is proposed that these enquiries would become the responsibility of the District Policing Teams.

Northern, Southern and Western District each have, generally, 1 x FTE allocated from each Patrol team to manage these enquiries. The exception is Aldinga where there is 1 enquiries member. They are accountable to their respective team supervisors and work alongside their team, with the exception being night shift. This is also a position that has increased work flexibility. This does result in some Districts having more members completing these enquiries due to the different rosters throughout the Districts. In Eastern District all of the enquiries are spread amongst the team. This was an inefficient way of clearing investigations, with members finding it difficult to attend to enquiries whilst having to respond to taskings throughout the shifts and some team members lacking the expertise to complete the enquiries. If the proposed District Allocation Member (DAM) SOP is approved the manner in which investigations will be allocated will be standardised across MOS.

Another key factor in the allocation of enquiries is the even distribution of enquiries amongst the Patrol Teams. With the change of boundaries Western District experienced an uneven allocation of investigations and adopted the District Policing Team (DPT) suburbs (of which there are 12 areas per District) as per DPM Stage 2 and altered the distribution to allocate across 15 teams. The 12 DPT areas were determined by the Organisational Reform Team to ensure an even distribution of work across the DPT Teams. The adoption of these areas saw the distribution of enquiries become even throughout the District. This could be easily implemented due to the District having 3 teams with equal staffing on the same roster.

The different rosters and staffing numbers across Patrol Teams throughout the Districts makes the even distribution of enquiries problematic. Standardised rosters throughout the Districts would assist in the even distribution of enquiries, however, the uneven distribution of staff across patrol bases complicates the distribution of enquiries further. For example, Eastern District has 4 Patrol stations, with 3 different rosters.

Southern District is trialling a DV assessment and allocation position within CFIS. This role is being completed by 2 Patrol members for a 6 month trial. The Organisational Reform Team was not aware of this trial until the audit was conducted. These positions are OE positions so are not directly affecting Patrol staffing, however, if the OE positions decrease it will negatively impact staffing. The reasons surrounding this trial are discussed in the SCAC component of this report.

There has been an increase in the number of Community Constables (CC's) across MOS. Southern District (2), Northern District (1) and Western District (1). CC's have been placed into OE positions, however, Patrol positions are then required to fill the General Duties partner positions. The number of CC's and their General Duties partners in the relevant Districts are Southern District (2), Northern District (8), Eastern District (6) and Western District (8). These positions are supervised by an Operations Senior Sergeant, which was an interim measure pending the implantation of DPM Stage 2. Under DPM Stage 2, CC's are to come under the supervision of a DPT Sergeant. Due to the increased workload surrounding these workgroups administrative functions such as vetting have increased and in some instances are being delegated to other supervisors within the Districts.

Further changes to structure have been made surrounding:

- Western District – Expansion of NPT's. 4 x VCT GD positions utilised to cover NPT suburbs from Holden Hill that became part of Western District. Since then 4 Response members from the District have been rotating through the NPT on a 10 weekly basis to assist in the policing of the NPT areas subject to high volumes of crime.

- Eastern District – Operation Paragon 1 x Sgt and 8 Patrol Members seconded to Operation Paragon until the implementation of DPM Stage 2. They function in a similar manner to an NPT within the Adelaide CBD.
- *Other changes to structure specific to Districts are covered in Appendix 1.*

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made, including:

- AC MOS to determine the structure to be utilised to manage enquiries throughout the Districts pending DPM Stage 2.
- FTE lost due to Part Time Agreements is included on the Service staffing reports.

2. The State Response Manager, State Crime Assessment Centre and Investigation Support Desk.

A table is included that shows the actual staffing of the State Response Manager, State Crime Assessment Centre and Investigation Support Desk.

This table is included as Appendix 2A.

The FTE and structure of these workgroups exists as was intended under the DPM with the only discrepancy being the inclusion of the Investigation Support Desk Logistics Officer. This position was supposed to be performed by a Comcen Operator on a periodic basis as directed by the Comcen Sergeant to act as a conduit between the SRM and the Comcen. This position has never been utilised within Comcen since the implementation of the ISD.

At the time the audit was conducted on staffing in February there was 1 ISD Intelligence Officer position vacant. This had been since inception. Anecdotal information suggests the location (CBD) and full shift work may be contributing factors. The position has been advertised and selected multiple times with selected candidates declining the position.

There has been 1 SRM on secondment from the position. Issues surrounding the staffing, rostering and absenteeism of the SRM from the position is discussed under the Audit of Standard Operating Procedures – State Response Manager component of this report.

Since the initial audit on staffing was conducted, Communications Group have been contacted in April 2018, 5 x OE S/C/Constable positions had been seconded into the SCAC for a 6 month period. There is now 1 further Intelligence Officer vacancy in the ISD.

AUDIT OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Crime Co-ordination Section

District Intelligence Unit (DIU)

The District Intelligence Units are providing similar intelligence products and intelligence services in each of the Districts. The SOP describes a clear distinction between sworn roles in the form of the Intelligence Officer (IO) and Tactical Intelligence Officer (TIO). Where the TIO's focus should be on a 'forward intelligence capability', gathering information and intelligence in order to reduce crime and identify emerging trends in the Districts, the IO's focus should be on an intelligence support capability, assisting with the analysis of information, assessing crime trends and developing intelligence products. The way in which the TIO's are operating within the District is not in line with the SOP.

TIO's are generally not gathering intelligence and are instead completing work within the office that is the role of the IO's. There are a number of factors contributing to this non-compliance including rosters, staffing, IO vacancies, culture, training and the implementation of Shield. Statistics gathered in relation to work load as part of this audit highlight the lack of 'forward intelligence capability' with DIU's across MOS submitting (on average) 3 Street Checks and submitting or value adding to (on average) 15 Intelligence Submissions per week. The SOP does not prescribe any Key Performance Indicators for the DIU's and they are not measured on their performance at Senior Management Team meetings on a regular basis if at all.

DIU's are supposed to provide coverage 0700 – 2300hours 7 days per week. An analysis of DIU rosters across the Districts was conducted over a 3 month period that identified that on 37% of days this is not occurring, with the majority of these days falling on a Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. This is mainly contributed to the 2 week roster, the lean staffing structure, vacant IO positions being covered by TIO's and the small workgroup. TIO's shifts and function are being changed to relieve IO positions to ensure that the daily business requirements of the District are met. IO vacancies, staffing and rosters need to be addressed if DIU's are to provide coverage 0700 – 2300, 7 days per week.

The Daily TCG and Daily Intelligence Brief are the main drivers of the DIU's. The IO's, Intelligence Analyst and Intelligence Support Officer are all required to work each morning to prepare for the TCG. A large amount of time is required to review the crime that has occurred since they left the office the previous day as opposed to actively providing intelligence on the crime that has occurred. Shield has negatively impacted this process with many tasks and analysis taking more time than with previous systems. The data provided in the current TCG reports are insufficient. Data warehouse have been contacted, are now aware of these issues and are developing solutions to provide the required information.

The SCAC assesses Crime Occurrences on priority. The DAM only see those occurrences that require further investigation. As a result neither will generally observe pattern crime. The structure, staffing and information available to the ISD means they will not necessarily observe pattern crime. This is discussed further in the ISD component of this report. The DIU is left to review crime, determine patterns and analyse on a daily basis. With the introduction of Shield previous automated searches lack the required information. Further development needs to occur by Data

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Warehouse and BSU to create and modify existing searches for information required by DIU's on a daily basis to allow them more time to analyse crime.

Consultation has occurred with the Intelligence Business Process review team. This review is assessing the business processes of Intelligence areas in an effort to streamline processes and improve efficiency. The inefficient processes regarding the preparation for the TCG and DIB have been noted as part of their review. It is anticipated that improved business processes as a result of this review will improve efficiencies in the DIU.

Further workload is being placed on the DIU's due to the SCAC not assessing crime in near real time or conducting a rigorous assessment of Occurrences. DIU's are being tasked to assess crime and change, or cause to be changed, errors that are identified.

In addition to the aforementioned staffing issues, there are strong cultural issues within DIU's relating to the TIO position. TIO's should be working in an operational capacity, gathering intelligence, monitoring addresses, developing sources of information and targeting problem areas as per the SOP. Instead there is a strong culture relating to remaining in the office assessing intelligence submissions, monitoring the CAD for events of interest and updating intelligence products for the next day. To exacerbate this culture, supervisors are not, in general, preparing and managing field operations as per the SOP. Improvement in this area may assist in promoting TIO's to actively move out of the office.

The Intelligence Training Unit are conducting modular training specific to roles within the DIU. This training is not compulsory. Given the small number of TIO's within the Districts, it is recommended that further training be made available to TIO's and consideration be given to making these courses compulsory once a member is in a substantive position. Increased training may provide increased confidence to TIO's in completing their role.

The SOP duplicates roles between the DIU supervisor and the DAM in relation to warrants. As per the DAM component of this report, the proposed DAM SOP will see the DAMS responsible for the tiering and allocation of warrants. The CCS SOP will need to be amended to reflect this. *General Order Warrant Procedures* describes the tiering guidelines.

The SOP does not prescribe what tasks are to be completed on a day to day basis or how they are to be completed. It is recommended that a DIU SOP be developed in a similar format to the DAM SOP (explained below), to drive consistency and avoid any ambiguity in role and function on a day to day basis.

Refer to Appendix 3A for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- Reviewing the staffing model and roster of TIO's.
- The development of a prescriptive DIU SOP in a similar manner to the proposed DAM SOP.
- An increased number of modular training courses to be provided to DIU.
- The development of improved searches on information that DIU require on a daily basis.

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- The introduction of KPI's for DIU to be reported on at the monthly Senior Management Team meeting.

District Allocation Members (DAM)

Nine of the 24 tasks the SOP states the DAM will complete are not being completed by any of the DAMs and there are a number of other tasks that are being completed by some DAMs but not others *as per Appendix 4B*. Six of these tasks should be removed from the SOP as it has been identified that it is no longer a role for the DAM to perform due to their function under the DPM model. With the introduction of the SCAC, the DAM no longer assess Crime Occurrences, will not see all Crime Occurrences and their main function relates to the allocation of tasks. The tasks that should be removed from the SOP include:

- Expedite less serious crime efficiently.
- Task and Co-ordinate the collection of CCTV footage.
- In collaboration with the DIU, provide information for daily briefings to patrol.
- The DAM will be conversant with the activities of VCT targets.
- Crime Prevention will utilize the DAM as a resource to assist in identifying proactive crime reduction initiatives and assessing community needs.
- Liaise with patrol supervisors and assist in the deployment of patrols, VCT and CIB members.

CMU journals are not being maintained as per the SOP, the main reason being that they don't review all crime each day due to the introduction of the SCAC.

Subsequently, CMU journals have become inaccurate. Northern District is trialling standardised data entry into fields in Shield and not using the CMU journal at all. If this proves to be successful, the CMU journal could cease. The better utilisation of Shield and standardised searches could also decrease the duplication of effort required to maintain the journal in addition to the benefits mentioned for the DIU.

The management and review of Whereabouts Flags and the timely completion of Crime Stopper, DNA and Fingerprint actions is not being completed by DAMs. This is occurring due to the inability to effectively complete these tasks with the introduction of Shield. The inability to audit these actions and Whereabouts Flags poses an organisational risk. Enhancements are required to enable DAMs to effectively complete these functions. A DNA/Fingerprint Task report is sent to CCS S/Sgts and the DAM. This can be used to audit DNA and Fingerprint tasks as required.

Intervention Orders are being managed by the DAMs with the exception of Northern District where a station position was being used to manage Intervention Orders and assist in their service. This may have a negative impact on front counter services. This is not included in the SOP.

A DAM specific SOP has been approved. This was created by the Northern District CCS in consultation with the other District CCS managers. This SOP sets out the specific day to day tasks completed by the DAM and an agreed process for each of these tasks. Intervention Orders have been included as part of this SOP. The manner in which DAMs were allocating investigations differed throughout all of the Districts. The approval and introduction of this SOP should see a consistent approach adopted throughout all of the Districts for all of the tasks conducted by the DAMs. The CCS SOP will need to be updated to reflect these changes.

Refer Appendix 3B for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- Allocating the review of the DAM SOP to a CCS manager to review and approve on a 6 monthly basis.
- Automating the review function of Whereabouts Flags on Shield, resulting in no initial user input requirement and DAM's being notified of the review.
- CMU journals are no longer used pending the trial in Northern District utilising Shield.
- Some functions of the DAM SOP are removed that are not required and Intervention Orders are added.
- The CCS SOP is amended to reflect any changes.

Human Source Management Liaison Officer (HSMLO)

The CCS S/Sgt is required to "ensure strict compliance with General Order, Human Source Management, of all members within the section and facilitate information exchange with Human Source Management Section." However, the CCS S/Sgt does not audit any of the information relating to Human Sources and has limited to no ability to ensure compliance with this General Order in relation to the HSMLO's. Further, except for those CCS S/Sgt that have previous experience/training in Human Source Management, the CCS S/Sgt have, in general, had no training in this area and would need to be trained if they were to have an understanding of Human Source Management and be able to ensure compliance with the GO. SIB is currently undertaking a review of *General Order: Human Source Management* and are aware of the reporting relationship with the CCS S/Sgt. There is an extremely limited ability for S/Sgt to ensure strict compliance with the General Order and SOP.

In the Northern District the HSMLO provides a summary each month to the CCS S/Sgt of their activity. The same occurs in Southern District. In Western District no summary is provided. The way in which the report is collated and provided differs between Northern and Southern District.

Refer Appendix 3C for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including.

- The General Order, Human Source Management, be amended to reflect the CCS SOP and Crime Co-ordination Senior Sergeant PID.
- Training be provided to the CCS S/Sgts relative to their role with the HSMLO.
- The Crime Coordination SOP relative to the HSMLO remains unchanged, pending the results of the review of General Order, Human Source Management.
- HSMLO's across all of the Districts provide the same report to the CCS Senior Sergeant on activity which is presented at the Senior Management Team Meeting. The Crime Co-ordination SOP is updated to reflect this requirement (pending the review of General Order, Human Source Management)

Victim Contact Officer

The Victim Contact Officers throughout the Districts are all operating in a similar manner and completing duties required of them as per the SOP. All District VCO's are contacting victims as required. Statistics gathered as part of the audit determined that between 5th July 2018 and the 31st December 2018 the number of Victim Contacts recorded (as per the VCO spreadsheets in each District) were Eastern (1360), Western (2665), Northern (2262) and Southern (1833). Apart from Eastern District all Districts appear to have similar workload in terms of the number of victims contacted. The spreadsheets maintained vary slightly in each District. A standardised spreadsheet and guidelines in the SOP as to when contact will be recorded will ensure consistency across the Districts. Given the Districts have been designed to provide equalisation of workload across MOS. Victim contacts should be similar across the Districts.

Given that the distribution of crime has been equalised as a result of the District Policing Model, the number of victims being contacted by Victim Contact Officers across the District should also be equal. Ensuring the criteria for contact and the way in which contact is recorded across the District will ensure standard operation.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- A standard spreadsheet is developed to record victim contact information and is used across MOS.
- A VCO SOP is developed to prescribe the day to day function of the Victim Contact Officer as per the DAM SOP.

Operations Co-ordination Section

Missing Persons

The Missing Persons units across all Districts are complying with the SOP. There are significant differences in the workloads experienced by each District as a result of missing and absent GOM Children. Southern District have the largest amount of missing GOM Children, accounting for 50% of the GOM Missing Person Reports (MPR) across MOS and averaging 150+ more MPR than any other District per month. To manage the increased workload, Southern District have allocated one extra member to the Missing Persons unit. Current staffing levels are a minimum to achieve coverage across day and afternoon shift on a regular basis as described in the SOP. AC MOS has been consulted in relation to staffing of Missing Person across the Districts. An analysis of the average time a MPR remained open pre and post DPM revealed the average time remained approximately the same; however the implementation of the Missing Person units within the Districts will ensure increased risk mitigation and improve service delivery in this area.

The OCS S/Sgt's expressed concerns regarding supervision and staff numbers and the associated risks with missing persons, particularly regarding GOM children. Benefits of increased supervision sighted included increased liaison and problem solving with internal and external agencies to reduce repeat absences (particularly in relation to GOM children), improved risk mitigation and increasing the availability of MP officers to attend to investigations and enquiries, with the supervisor attending meetings and being the day to day contact in relation to stakeholder engagement and problem solving initiatives.

Whilst Missing Person units are complying with the SOP, the way in which each unit operates differs slightly throughout the Districts. The development of a specific Missing Persons SOP that was developed in consultation with all of the Districts would ensure best practice is utilised and consistency in operation.

Refer Appendix 4A for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- The development of a prescriptive Missing Person SOP in a similar manner to the proposed DAM SOP.
- AC MOS to determine how an extra position is created in Southern District Missing Persons.

Brief Quality Control Officer (BQCO)

The BQCO's across the Districts are complying with the SOP and operating in a consistent manner. The implementation of Shield impacted the BQCO's and limited training was provided. The audit identified that the officers were utilising the same method to manage tasks and files.

Their ability to manage files and ensure submission timelines are complied with in terms of the offence streaming model are limited. BQCO's are reliant on Investigating Officers submitting files on time and have not identified a means of tracking files that have been sent back for rework to ensure submission. This represents an

organisational risk. Further work will need to be conducted with BSU to develop a solution to this issue.

Shield has impacted the ability of the BQCO to identify common errors identified with files. Errors identified and the return rate of files could be determined with ORMS but not Shield. Some of the Districts are keeping spreadsheets to record information and report to management to improve submission standards. The use of the same spreadsheet across all Districts will ensure consistency in reporting and the management of the office. A consistent issue identified as a result of the audit was the ability of assistants to access Shield to the required level in the absence of the supervisor. BQCO officers require the same level of access to ensure the office runs in the absence of the supervisor. It is anticipated that the efficiency of the BQCO office will improve as BQCO's and frontline members become more proficient in the use of Shield.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- The development of a prescriptive BQCO SOP in a similar manner to the proposed DAM SOP.
- All officers within the BQCO office are given supervisor access to ensure the efficient functioning of the office.
- A method of tracking files through Shield is developed to ensure compliance with the Offence Streaming Model.

Planning

The District Planning officers are complying with the SOP in terms of planning for events and operations. Areas within the SOP that are not being completed or completed to a limited extent include debriefs of operations and reviews of Emergency Response Plans. With the exception of Western District, all of the other Districts had a large number of Emergency Response Plans that were required to be reviewed.

The Districts are not operating in a consistent manner. The way in which Districts are classifying, managing, recording and producing documentation for events at a local level varied. As a result, the data that was obtained is difficult to assess, especially the data relating to local events. Data was obtained from the Districts in relation to Special and Major Events and is attached as a table as under Appendix 4B, with Eastern District having the largest workload and Northern District having the least. Anecdotal evidence and observations made during the audit support this. As a result of the audit it appeared that Eastern District had developed efficient processes to manage this workload.

While it is recognized that each District may have slightly different planning priorities, the differences in operation meant that no planner from one District would be able to go into another planning office and complete the similar role without training as to the processes of the other office. A definitive workload analysis would be difficult to conduct due to the issues identified. The data obtained and observations made indicate a vast discrepancy in the workload of Northern and Eastern District.

An SOP that standardized the role and function of Planning officer and assistant and standardized the classification, documentation and communication of events would ensure best and most efficient practices were utilised. This would lead to better

information sharing, more efficient work practices and continuity throughout the Districts.

Refer to Appendix 4B for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- The development of a prescriptive Planning SOP in a similar manner to the proposed DAM SOP.
- Eastern District are allocated another planning position. AC MOS to determine where this position is allocated from.
- Planning Officers ensure Emergency Response Plans are maintained.

Crime Prevention Section (CPS)

The District Crime Prevention Sections are complying with the SOP but each District has a slightly different focus based on the demographics of the District. The CPS are implementing SAPOL's Crime prevention initiatives, predominantly surrounding Neighbourhood Watch Programs, Blue Light initiatives (except for Northern District) and other community education and engagement programs with schools, businesses and other community stakeholders with oversight from the State Community Engagement Section. Each District raised concerns regarding their ability to conduct their role with limited capacity to change shift, reducing service delivery to the community. CPS across all Districts have changed the service they provide to adapt to the day shift role. CPS within some districts were completing tasks relating to the notification of Drug Diversions and in other Districts, Administrative Support Officers were completing this function.

Refer to Appendix 4C for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- Administration Officers within the Districts complete Tasks relating to Drug Diversions.
- The amendment of the SOP to reflect any changes made.

Training, Recruit and Probationary Constable Coordinator (RPCC)

All Districts are complying with the SOP. An audit of the Training Compliance reports for Cycle 6 2018 revealed that all Districts were achieving similar compliance rates with Corporate Training of approximately 90%. Each District was conducting local training based on the specific needs of the Districts as required; however, the amount of training that is provided is limited due to the ongoing workload with Corporate Training and RPCC duties.

The different rosters in some of the Districts increased the workload of trainers, with trainers having to run more sessions to cater for the different rosters. Eastern District was a particular example of this with a number of different rosters across patrol bases throughout the District. Further workload was added to trainers in Western and Southern District, who provide training for Road Policing Sections North and South respectively. Trainers in Northern District also sighted issues surrounding suitable training facilities, with training rooms at both Salisbury and Elizabeth insufficient to cater for staff.

The number of Probationary Constables managed throughout each District varied with Western (88), Northern (83), Eastern (62) and Southern (48) at the time of the audit and all of the RPCC's sighted a large workload associated with the management of P/C's. OE staff in Southern and Eastern District have influenced the allocation of P/C's as HR have not been able to allocate as many P/C's to these Districts. HR are aware of the uneven number of P/C's across the Districts and are addressing the issue.

The scheduling and data entry of training records differed throughout all of the Districts, with Administration Support Officers offering varying degrees of support to the Trainers with regard to the scheduling and data entry of training. Apart from Northern District, Business support are not complying with their SOP in relation to the data entry and scheduling of training. AC MOS is aware and will be addressing this issue.

Training and RPCC officers are attending the required Training Coordinators meeting, however a common issue was raised in relation to the lack of formal RPCC meetings provided by the Human Resource Development Branch (HRDB). With RPCC officers having meetings in the lunch breaks of the TCM meeting.

A consistent issue raised by Training and RPCC related to the reporting relationship with the Human Resource Development Branch (HRDB). HRDB are administratively responsible for managing the following aspects of the role including:

- The Constable Development Program.
- Corporate Training Program.
- Uniform Ordering.
- HR21/Workforce Central.

Whilst approving leave the District Support Team S/Sgt, attached to HRDB and based at the Academy, is not otherwise made aware of any SL, FL, CC etc taken by the Trainer/RPCC based throughout the Districts and does not have daily interaction with the Trainer/RPCC role. This is an inefficient system for the taking of leave (expected/unexpected) and subsequent approvals.

Whilst the Training and RPCC staff are attached to HRDB, Districts are providing members to relieve these positions when leave is taken as opposed to the Academy. Under the model the Academy were supposed to back fill absences.

Were the Trainer/RPCC positions administratively aligned to the Operations Coordination Section Senior Sergeants under the Districts, this would alleviate all existing IS&T/Administrative issues identified and streamline processes now and in the future when positions require relief.

Refer to Appendix 4D for further information.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- Administration Support Officers within the Districts comply with their SOP in relation to the data entry of training.

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- AC MOS to review the existing SOP in line with the issues raised in this Audit in relation to the Trainer/RPCC's reporting relationship with the HRDB.

u p r e b h O e a i n P o g a B a d

Investigation Support Desk (ISD)

The ISD are complying with their SOP in terms of providing real time oversight on current incidents as their capacity permits. The volume of events that require assessment (as per the SOP), the total volume of events, requests from frontline members (both valid and those that should go through their own District Intelligence Unit), task creep and staffing all impact the ability of the ISD to complete this role. The ISD are providing a high quality service and layer of risk mitigation by providing information regarding current incidents. This information is invaluable to the SRM and SSM in making informed decisions in time critical incidents such as pursuits. With current technological support the ISD does not currently have the ability to identify pattern crime. This may be improved with the implementation of data analytics and live crime mapping.

An analysis of the events that are required to be assessed as per the SOP was conducted over a 3 month period. An average of 72.45% of the required Grade 1 events, 47.32% of the required Grade 2 events and 44.35% of Grade 3 events were assessed. On any given shift there can be over 2000 SACAD taskings. The average time spent on an event by an ISD Intelligence Officer was 50 minutes with a maximum of 3 x IO's working in the ISD. The ISD are limited in the events they are able to assess and risk manage the events they assess. The risk management of the events assessed is not included in the SOP. Grade 1 events carry the most risk and take priority of assessment, however, due to capacity, not all Grade 1 events will always be assessed.

Since the inception of the ISD and the SOP, a revised ISD SOP has been produced and changes made to the original SOP. This has not been submitted and approved at the time this report was completed. A number of additional functions and expansions of original functions have been added to the SOP. The increased number of functions impacts the ability of the ISD to function as intended. Consistent managerial oversight may assist in making informed balanced decisions regarding the ISD. Functions added include vetting all Forensic Procedures for DDI's (in the original SOP it was after hours only), Extended Supervision Orders, Integrated Public Number Database (IPND – Subscriber Checks- out of hours only), Interstate Warrant Enquiries and Interim Firearms Prohibition Orders after hours. Whilst the addition of IPND checks represents an improved service and increased capability in this area, the addition of vetting all Forensic Procedures for DDI's 24/7 represents an ancillary function that may take their focus away from current events. These proposed changes have been made in a consultative approach between the SRM Portfolio Manager and ISD Supervisors.

Under the "Reporting" component of the SOP the ISD are responsible for briefing operational members via an Intelligence Briefing on any "hot issues and priorities" and "... any emerging trends/patterns or current crime series". With current technological support the ISD does not currently have the ability to identify pattern crime. This may be improved with the implementation of data analytics and live crime mapping as recommended in this report. Qualitative data from the Districts and from supervisors within the ISD confirms this. This is also supported by the low number of Intelligence Submissions created and disseminated by the ISD.

The ISD monitor SACAD. All events that appear on SACAD will not eventuate in a Crime Occurrence and due to the previously mentioned volume, the ISD are not necessarily going to identify patterns in any extent. The ISD do not monitor Shield and do not have the capacity to regularly monitor this system. The SCAC assess

crime on priority as opposed to area and type and the DAM only receive Occurrences that require further investigation. Neither will generally identify pattern crime.

Information from the ISD is that there are currently mapping programs under development that would display events and event types on a map as they are being reported. Further research and development into the implementation of current crime mapping and displaying on the TCD wall will enhance the capacity of the ISD to identify pattern crime. Data should be gleaned from SACAD and Shield and displayed on the same map to ensure all data is gathered and displayed to obtain a clear indication of crime patterns based on all available information. The ability to search for similar fact crime reporting in Shield is another tool the ISD could utilise to more effectively establish a pattern of offending or a crime series occurring. The ISD is not complying with the SOP with regard to identifying pattern crime. They are limited by staff resources and technological support. For an increase in capability relating to the identification of pattern crime, one of both of these factors would need to be addressed.

There has been a decline in the number of Incident Notification Reports (INR's) being created by the ISD since inception, starting at 89 in July 2018 and seeing a steady decline to 34 in February 2019. Qualitative information would suggest that this is due to the demand by management for briefing papers as opposed to INR's, meaning managers are opting to provide dot point emails for conversion to Briefing Papers as opposed to INR's. The Officer in Charge of Communication Group has advised that some work is already underway to cost a rework of the INR database to:

- Enable printing of the INR.
- Reformat the INR to a CBP format.
- Have the ability to generate, and print, a summary report of INR related incidents.

An issue raised by the ISD Supervisors was the lack of consistency in the management of the ISD. Since the inception of the ISD they have had 5 portfolio managers. Under the DPM model the ISD are aligned to an SRM on a shift by shift basis. There is one SRM who has the portfolio for the overall management of the ISD who is on a five week roster, working full shifts. In this shift pattern there is a period of 13 days where the SRM is on days off or night shift. The structure does not provide consistency for the ISD where issues can be identified, raised and managed in a timely manner. This is compounded by the rotation of managers through this role. Due to the ability of the ISD to provide a 24/7 service, task creep is evidently occurring where the ISD's list of functions is growing. Consistent management is important to ensure a balanced approach to the ongoing management of the ISD in line with their intended role and function as part of the DPM as well as providing consistency within the ISD as a work group.

Refer to Appendix 5 for further information, statistics and graphs.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- Vetting tasks relating to Forensic Procedures are only completed by the ISD D/Sgt during night shift where the applicants supervisor is not available.
- A determination is made in relation to the ongoing value INR's provide in line with their intended outcome.
- The ability to provide real time crime mapping data from Shield and SACAD is developed for display on the TCD and analysis by ISD.

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- The ISD SOP is amended pending the approval of any of the recommendations.
- The ISD working to their SOP for a further 9 months, with increased technological support as recommended above, after which a further audit is conducted.
- The event types requiring ISD review are themselves reviewed to focus on prioritizing event types to be reviewed.

Spotlight Operations Strategic Plan

The State Crime Assessment Centre (SCAC)

The SCAC are processing occurrences, however, they not consistently and rigorously assessing crime as per the SOP and as intended under the DPM. As the SCAC is centralised, their non compliance in this aspect of the SOP has broad impacts throughout the organisation and the predicted level of assessment and reduction of workload for the frontline has yet to be realised. It must be recognised that the implementation of Shield has had a significant impact on the functioning of the SCAC and the wider organisation, resulting in an increased workload for the SCAC.

The original SCAC SOP was developed prior to the implementation of Shield and underwent an extensive consultation process with managers from relevant stakeholder groups, however, this document was not approved but was published in principle to provide guidance to operation. The audit was conducted using this SOP. Shield was implemented in November 2018 and an updated SCAC SOP has been developed in line with the new processes and will soon be submitted for approval which describes day to day tasks. It was not approved at the time the audit was conducted.

The implementation of Shield and higher than predicted total intake volumes has significantly impacted the ability of the SCAC to operate as intended. Intake volumes are approximately 20% higher than predicted, which was factored in to the original staffing model. Under the PIMS operating system, the SCAC was able to manage this higher demand with minimal issues, and processing all intakes in real time or near real time.

Occurrence processing times (75% longer in Shield than in PIMS), increased error rates from frontline members, higher than expected volumes of Occurrences and other errors in Shield have all impacted the workload of the SCAC and their ability to process Crime Occurrences in a timely manner. Information from Sgt Mark Atkinson, who was intimately involved in the development and implementation of the SCAC, suggests that the workload associated with the Vehicle Identification Examination Requests (VIDAS) and Acorn actions are higher than expected given the figures that were originally provided to determine the work load for the SCAC, further affecting the workload of the area.

The honouring of legacy leave, compounded by PDO's being granted where staffing was limited, had a further impact on the ability of the SCAC to manage their workload post the initial period after Shield implementation. A leave policy has since been introduced to better manage leave and prevent a re-occurrence. Increased management and oversight of this area would also ensure leave policies are adhered to.

Benefits sighted around the Business Case for the implementation of the SCAC were based on a consistent and uniform approach to crime management and promoting and enforcing high standards of reporting, ensuring high standards of report submission and high quality investigations proceed for further investigation.

Anecdotal evidence external and internal to the SCAC strongly suggests that this is not occurring to an acceptable level as envisioned during the design of the SCAC. DAM's throughout all Districts report inconsistencies in the assessment of Crime Occurrences and question the rigorous assessment of crime. Conversations with enquiries members, supervisors and patrol members throughout all Districts support this information, which is further supported by a SCAC supervisor who recognises an

inconsistent approach and lack of assessment of Crime Occurrences in some instances. It should also be noted that some of the issues raised in relation to the SCAC by officers external to the SCAC are invalid as they are commenting on previous processes that no longer apply under the new model.

As part of the Crime Coordination Section component of this report, consistent qualitative data from the DAM's suggest Crime Occurrences and the associated statements and evidence are not being consistently and rigorously assessed by the SCAC. Anecdotal information from DAM's suggests Crime Occurrences are being received by the DAM that should have been filed in the first instance and there seems to be an apprehension by the SCAC to risk manage and file Occurrences. Anecdotal information also suggests there are inconsistencies between teams and members within the SCAC as to the level of assessment.

A complicating factor and frustration for the SCAC are some inconsistent practices adopted by Districts for various crime types. This leads to confusion in the SCAC as to how to assess certain Occurrence types. These issues are raised and addressed by the SCAC on an ongoing basis to ensure the assessment of crime is consistent. Increased direct supervision and management of the SCAC would assist in driving consistency and ensuring a central point of contact for issues surrounding the assessment and classification of Crime Occurrences.

In Southern District a reallocation of members within CFIS has seen 2 General Duties members adopt the role of Domestic Abuse (DA) assessment and allocations. In the other Districts the CFIS supervisors are completing this function, taking up the majority of their time within a shift. The important points relating to Domestic Abuse related Occurrences are:

- The SCAC will not file Domestic Abuse Crime Occurrences where there is an offence. A Shield Task will be sent to CFIS, along with a second Task that contains the Domestic Abuse Risk Assessment. The Occurrence is required to be assessed and endorsed by CFIS prior to filing. These are sent direct to the District CFIS.
- The SCAC will still assess the quality of the Occurrence but will not assess the "prima facie" evidence as per other Crime Occurrences and will not file the Occurrence prior to an assessment by CFIS.
- This occurs due to the risk involved with Domestic Abuse Crime Occurrences and local knowledge in the District regarding repeat victims and other risks.
- The SCAC may file Non Offence Domestic Abuse Occurrences. The secondary Task relating to the risk assessment will still be received by CFIS.
- Anecdotal information suggests that not all DA Crime Occurrences are being assessed by the SCAC as with other Occurrences received.
- As a result of Shield it would appear the workload associated with the management of Domestic Abuse Offences and Non Offences has increased.

CFIS Sergeants are spending the vast majority of their shift assessing and allocating investigations to CFIS members, leaving little to no time to actually supervise staff and the investigations. This was supported by CFIS supervisors in the Northern District and Southern District. The SCAC SOP did not reflect the aforementioned process and is being addressed in the SOP that is yet to be approved.

In Northern District a review of 1513 Crime Occurrences was conducted and 352 errors identified by the SCAC in the first instance, representing an error rate of 23.3%. This provides a further indication of the issues surround the SCAC's rigorous

assessment of Crime Occurrences. It should be noted that these errors were based on the opinion/assessment of the member conducting the review of the Occurrences.

Anecdotal information from supervisors within the SCAC also suggests that there are inconsistencies in the operation of teams and also individuals within the SCAC, with approximately 50% of SCAC officers critically assessing Occurrences and the other 50% not.

There are a number of factors that have been identified that may contribute to these inconsistencies including an organisational structure that does not provide consistent and available direct management capability to drive consistency across the SCAC, a lack of ability for supervisors to monitor performance and manage staff, lack of training and the inability to monitor Key Performance Indicators (KPI's).

A State Shift Manager (SSM) is operationally responsible for a SCAC team each shift. Due to the different rosters worked, the SSM only aligns to the SCAC team for one night shift week out of the five week roster cycle. A State Response Manager has the Portfolio of managing the SCAC. The SRM works full shifts and there is a period of 13 days where the SRM is on days off or night shift, resulting in no consistent contact point for the SCAC on a day to day basis apart from the supervisors. Anecdotal evidence suggests the approach of supervisors is also inconsistent. The addition of a Senior Sergeant to oversee the day to day management of the SCAC and ISD, drive consistency and act as a key point of contact for the assessment of Crime Occurrences is recommended in the current structure. The implementation of the full communications group model will provide increased administrative support through this area and may substantiate or negate the need for an additional Senior Sergeant to oversee the SCAC.

Supervisors and Communications Group management do not have the ability to easily monitor standards and the performance of members. Supervisors need the ability to easily produce reports on individual performance and review assessed occurrences to ensure high, consistent standards are maintained. Further development needs to occur with BSU and IS&T to develop a method to monitor the performance of members in the SCAC. The performance management of individuals links in with the ability of managers to monitor the KPI's of the SCAC. An audit of IPM's for the SCAC, based on HR21 data, identified 7 SCAC members have a current Individual Performance Plan that is up to date and 35 are overdue for a review. The current workload may be a contributing factor to the poor compliance rate in this area.

There is an inability to monitor the KPI's listed in the SOP. The impact of not being able to monitor KPI's results in an inability to report accurately on the impact the SCAC is having on the wider organisation, a limited ability to view workload volume and an inability to measure KPI benchmark timings. The inability to access data in relation to the performance of the SCAC resulted in a limited capacity to audit the SOP (that had not been approved). The KPI's within the SOP do not provide all of the key performance data required to determine whether the SCAC is performing as intended. A separate body of work has been completed to identify the business requirements for the further KPI's to be developed and easily measured. The business requirements are with IS&T for progression at this time, and include KPI's to:

- Understand the volume of Crime Occurrences managed by the SCAC over a determined period of time.
- Determine the volume of Crime Occurrences the SCAC have assessed/investigated and subsequently finalised without impact on

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District/LSA policing resources. This information should be capable of providing a tangible figure and/or percentage as to the volume of work the SCAC have positively impacted on.

- Understand the volume of Crime Stoppers, Acorn, Child Abuse Intakes and Vehicle Inspection requests received over a determined period of time, and be able to measure if the reporting benchmarks have been met (i.e. the time the notification remained with the SCAC prior to allocation or finalisation).
- Measure the number of victim contacts made by the SCAC over a given period of time.
- Conduct an audit across the SCAC teams (and individuals if necessary) to determine team productivity.
- Conduct an audit of team activity from a finalisation perspective. This report will provide the ability to establish team tolerance/threshold towards reported crime and identify anomalies, whilst also identifying any likely training needs amongst teams/individuals.
- Understand the volume of Tasks sent utilising the rework workflow.
- Search for similar fact crime reporting as a way of more easily establishing a pattern of offending or a crime series occurring now (e.g. several illegal interferences occurring in the same suburb contemporaneously).

The availability of this data will allow for the improved management of the SCAC, the ability to monitor performance, drive consistency and determine whether the benefits of the SCAC are being realised.

Further development needs to occur with BSU and IST to be able to effectively monitor and report on these KPI's. Ideally KPI's should be able to be monitored "live" on a dashboard similar to that used to monitor call volumes. This has been included in the TCD business requirements document currently under consideration.

Acknowledging there exists a level of a lack of consistency in the assessment of investigations and the varied experience of members working in the SCAC it is recommended that further training be implemented. Officers who commence at the SCAC currently receive "on the job" training, spending 3 days with a senior member of the SCAC, being shown how to complete the tasks required of them. This training induction needs to be formalised and documented. Training also needs to be provided to current members to drive consistency throughout the workgroup. Of particular importance in the training, for both new and existing members, is the assessment of Crime Occurrences and the risk management associated with a rigorous assessment and filing where appropriate.

The SCAC is not carrying out a review of all warrants that have been endorsed 'address unknown' by a warrant enquiry officer after attempts have been made to locate a warrant subject. This is required under General Order: Warrant Procedures. This is not clear in the SOP and is currently being completed by an officer at SIB and it is the last planned SCAC task to be transitioned due to the volume of Shield Occurrences and the need to train SCAC members in this process.

SCAC members are also required to upload all warrants outside of business hours when Team Support Officers are not on duty. This is only occurring for Parole Warrants. Prior to the implementation of the SCAC warrants were only processed during business hours. As Parole Warrants are being processed outside of business hours the level of service provided by the SCAC represents an improvement. If warrants are not processed outside of business hours there are risks relating to offenders not being arrested where police interact with the offender but do not arrest them due to them having no knowledge of the warrant. That risk will remain if the

SCAC do not comply with the SOP but is a minimal risk. TSO's have altered their shifts to generally cover between 0700 – 1800 Monday to Friday to increase office coverage times.

Since late December the SCAC have generally not been calling victims for summary matters that are being filed. The Call Centre will advise victims on the phone if a matter is to be filed in the first instance if it is clear that there are absolutely no lines of enquiry. As per the SOP, "A key aspect of the finalisation process is to ensure the victim or reporting person has been appropriately informed and advised of the investigation outcome." It is unclear as to whether victims are always being contacted for low level offences. If this work is being completed by the Call Centre, the victim has been advised and the OEL on the Crime Occurrence endorsed accordingly, this is a more efficient process, a better use of resources and should continue. However, the SCAC is not complying with the SOP and meeting one of the key benefits sighted in the Business Case for the SCAC.

Refer to Appendix 6 for further information, statistics and graphs.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- The Communications Group model is fully implemented.
- The addition of a Detective Senior Sergeant to oversee the management of the SCAC and the ISD on a day to day basis is assessed post the implementation of the Communications Group model.
- Methods of retrieving KPI data relative to the SCAC are developed. This includes the performance of team members within the SCAC.
- Measurable Key Performance Indicators for the SCAC are developed based on the results of the above recommendation and based on those indicators described in this report.
- A KPI dashboard is developed to represent significant, live SCAC KPI data, similar to that used to monitor call volumes.
- Training is developed in relation to the assessment of Crime Occurrences and other tasks completed by the SCAC, to be provided to current members of the SCAC. Training should be focused on assessment and risk analysis of Crime Occurrences.
- An induction package is developed for new SCAC members that is documented and details the training given to new members.
- An assessment is made of the functions the SCAC is performing in line with the intent of the SCAC.
- The outcome of the CFIS Allocation and Assessment Trial is provided to the Operations Program Board,
- Warrants are either uploaded as per the SOP or the SOP is amended to reflect the current practices regarding warrants.

State Response Manager

The functions of the SRM and SSM are being completed as per the SOP as all of the responsibilities listed can be completed by either role. The concept of the 'outward' focus of the SRM on police incidents and resources across the state compared to the 'inward' focus of the SSM on the total call taking environment has not been realised as many of the functions overlap and result in both positions completing a similar function. Similarly, the concept of actively moving resources based on demand by the SRM has not been realised, with limited technological support to make decisions and the movement of resources happening irregularly. There is duplication in the work completed by the SRM and SSM and high absenteeism rates of the SRM from the role have resulted in the SSM conducting the functions of both roles on many occasions.

There was not a completed, finalised and approved SRM SOP when conducting this audit. A draft version of the SOP had been completed but not approved. This SOP was used as the basis for the audit, and is titled State Response Manager and Communications Shift Manager (commonly known as the State Shift Manager or SSM). For this report I will refer to the role as the SSM.

Whilst the functions of the SOP are being conducted, for the most part, the SSM role has reverted to how it was operating prior to the introduction of the SRM role in June 2018. When the SRM is present, the way in which officers perform the role varies. There is increased risk mitigation and risk management in some instances, however, in many cases the roles are duplicative in their function. For example, SSM's will monitor the state-wide dispatch and patrol resource commitments at events and provide advice to the SRM in relation to resourcing. The SRM will be looking at the same events and in essence making similar assessments to the SSM. There is increased risk mitigation and management as there are 2 Officers assessing events and are more likely to observe an issue or work collaboratively to reduce risk and manage an event appropriately, however, it is duplicative. Pursuits are an example of where the 2 roles can work well, with the Pursuit Commander (SSM) managing the pursuit and the SRM assisting with resourcing and a broader oversight.

The SOP describes the relationship between the SRM and SSM as having two distinct roles:

The SRM "has a primary focus on the total State-wide policing environment, providing an 'outward facing' strategic focus on crime events and SAPOL resources on a shift by shift basis. The SRM is responsible for the operational management of the ISD and CSM on a shift-by-shift basis."

The SSM provides "24/7 support to the SRM with a primary focus on the total Communications Group total call taking environment; The SSM reports to the on shift SRM and has a primary focus on the total Communications Group call taking environment, providing an 'inward facing' operational focus on Communications Centre, Call Centre and State Crime Assessment Centre operations."

The reference to "inward" and "outward" focus is then confused as the responsibilities of the SSM and the SRM are listed. Numerous functions listed for the SSM and then joint responsibilities have an outward operational focus on resourcing and incidents. An analysis of SRM and SSM interaction with SACAD events was gathered that identified the SSM had (on average) 6146 interactions with SACAD events a month as opposed to 943 interactions by the SRM from the 5th July 2018 to the end of

February 2019. Another issue with the inward and outward focus is that many responsibilities overlap resulting in unclear role delineation. Absenteeism of the SRM from the position has resulted in the SSM completing all of the responsibilities on many occasions.

A common understanding expressed by the SSM and SRM's in relation to an "inward facing" focus refers to:

- Managing 000 and 131444 call volumes between the call centre and Police Communications to cater for demand and moving resources to manage demand to meet benchmarks.
- Management of overtime and recall of members within Communications as required.
- Management of the SCAC and management of continuity plans to ensure service delivery in the event of a failure at either the Call Centre or Communications Centre.

Feedback from those interviewed and from previous call centre supervisors suggests that there is not a full time role in an SSM having an internal focus only and currently this part of the role would account for a small portion of workload. The trial of the Telephone Resolution Desk is another internal resource that will need to be managed to ensure it is effectively utilised, moving this resource to assist in the reduction of events within Districts. Clarity needs to be provided through the SOP as to the role and function of these positions to ensure they are fully utilised.

In terms of the "outward focus", information suggests SRM's are on average only moving resources once a shift. The movement of resources could be as simple as moving an Eastern District patrol to Western District to assist in clearing events. In many instances the active movement of resources by the SRM is ineffective as by the time resources are moved and travel to the destination the resourcing requirement is no longer an issue and may have created a gap in resources from the originating District. The Recommended function is assisting in the deployment of resources to high grade events. The Comcen Operators use the AVL information of patrols to utilise patrols effectively from neighbouring Districts to assist with taskings. The SRM's role is to ensure that Grade 1 and 2 response times are maintained and resolving disputes by Districts which the dispatcher cant.

The SRM has limited information to make resourcing decisions apart from utilising SACAD and assessing pending events. As discussed in the ISD component of this report, there are currently limited resources available to identify pattern crime as it happens, resulting in limited information being provided to make an informed decision on pattern crime and move resources accordingly. For the SRM to make informed decisions on resourcing based on pattern crime further investment in this technology would need to occur as detailed in the ISD component of this report.

The ISD and SCAC were implemented and functioning prior to the implementation of the SRM, working under the management of the SSM. Anecdotal evidence suggests the introduction of the SRM was met with negativity from some parts of Police Communications where members question the validity of the role. Initially, frontline resources were pushing back on decisions made by the SRM, however, this was to be expected with the introduction of a new position and a new approach active resource management across the state.

Absenteeism of SRM's from the role has also influenced this negative culture, with poor relationships between the roles of some SRM's and SSM's evident. As per the SOP the SRM and SSM are to provide 24/7 coverage at Police Communications. An

assessment of the SSM and SRM roster from the 13th December 2018 – 5th February 2019 (55 days) revealed that 69% of the time the SRM did not cover a 24 hour period each day. Over the same period the SSM did not cover the roster 12% of the time. A further analysis between the 13th February 2019 and the 9th March 2019 identified there were only two SRM's out of six working at Communications for two weeks and three SRMs out of six working for two weeks. Anecdotal information from SSM's also suggest that some SRM's, even when at work, are absent for large periods of the shift attending to other matters. SSM's have been effectively managing to staff both roles during these absences.

With the rosters of the SRM there is no central managerial reporting point for workgroups within Police Communications on a daily basis. The six SRM's work a five week full shift roster aligned to the SCAC and ISD, have portfolios assigned to them and are responsible for a corresponding ISD team on a shift by shift basis. Of particular relevance are the Portfolios relating to the SCAC and ISD. There is a period of 13 days where the SRM is on days off or night shift in their roster. The structure does not provide a consistent point of contact for these Portfolios. While some portfolios may not need the consistent day to day contact point, it has been identified through this audit that consistent management, particularly of the SCAC, is critical in ensuring it operates effectively and consistently. The implementation of the Communications Support Branch structure will provide the increased administrative management that is currently lacking.

The SSM works a five week extended hours roster (different to the SRM/ISD/SCAC 5 week roster) in line with a corresponding Communications Team. The SSM is also responsible for oversight of a SCAC team but due to the different rosters they only align for 1 week out of 5. The difference in roster between the SSM and SRM creates further issues regarding the coverage of the SRM role in their absence. If an SRM is absent, the SSM can't simply relieve up and fill the SRM role as it will leave a gap in the SSM roster line and they do not correspond. SSM's will therefore complete the role of the SRM in their absence for the part of the shift and are not officially relieving as the SRM.

The SSM/SRM has more support under the DPM. The ISD provide real time information regarding current events. This has been sighted by both roles as providing increased situational awareness and risk mitigation regarding the management of events, incidents and pursuits. There are now 2 x DDI's in each District, providing increased leadership on the frontline.

Refer to Appendix 7 for further information, statistics and graphs.

Recommendation Summary

Recommendations have been made including:

- The SRM SOP is reviewed and clearly delineates the role and function of the SRM and SSM to effectively utilize both positions.
- The SRM SOP states that no more than 2 members should be moved in/out of the position at any one time.
- The updated SOP is approved.
- The SRM role is fully staffed.
- The SRM/SSM work to their SOP for a further 9 months, fully staffed and with increased technological support as described in the ISD recommendation, after which a further audit is conducted in relation to the SRM SOP and role.

S p o t d a y t e p h o t o s r r m o r

SUMMARY

This audit identified that the structures and FTE are in place in line with the DPM. Some alterations have been made by Districts to assist in the management of Property due to a Northern Property Store not being established. Changes have been made to Southern CFIS to manage the assessment and allocation of Domestic Abuse related tasks. An increased number of Community Constables have been added to Districts. Other small changes to structure have been made but the majority of these changes have been completed using OE positions. OE positions within MOS have limited the impact of overall vacancies within the Districts. As these positions diminish, changes in structure will have an increased impact on work areas if they are maintained. There were inconsistencies in the staffing and management of enquiries completed by Patrols throughout the Districts. It is recommended AC MOS determine the structure to be utilised to manage enquiries throughout the Districts.

There were instances of non-compliance with the SOP in both the CCS and OCS throughout the Districts. There were also inconsistencies in operation between areas within CCS and OCS throughout the Districts. Recommendations have been made to address issues of non-compliance with the SOP and inconsistencies in operations. The development of prescriptive SOP's relevant to each area within the CCS and OCS will ensure best practice is utilised across the Districts, improve efficiency in operation and ensure consistency.

The ISD were, in general, complying with their SOP. They are limited in their capacity to comply with components of their SOP due to resourcing and technological support. The ISD provide a high quality service and layer of risk mitigation by providing information regarding current incidents and are a valuable source of information for the SRM and SSM. Due to the limited information available to them, they are not regularly and consistently identifying pattern crime as it occurs. Investment in technological support to the ISD will assist in their ability to identify pattern crime and better inform the SRM and SSM. Task creep should be monitored within the ISD to ensure their capacity to monitor current events is retained.

The SCAC are processing occurrences, however, they not consistently and rigorously assessing crime as per the SOP and as intended under the DPM. As the SCAC is centralised, their non-compliance in this aspect of the SOP has broad impacts throughout the organisation and the predicted level of assessment and reduction of workload for the frontline has yet to be realised. Districts are utilising staff to try and rectify these issues. Shield has had a significant impact on the SCAC and the wider organisation. The impact of Shield, an inability to effectively monitor and manage the performance of members of the SCAC, a lack of direct management, training and insufficient, measurable Key Performance Indicators are factors that were identified as part of this audit that have contributed to the SCAC not consistently and rigorously assessing reported crime. Recommendations have been made in this audit to address these factors, improve service delivery and drive consistency in line with their SOP.

The functions of the SRM and SSM are being completed as per the SOP as all of the responsibilities listed can be completed by either role. The concept of actively moving resources based on demand by the SRM has not been realised, with limited technological support to make decisions and the movement of resources happening irregularly. There is duplication in the work completed by the SRM and SSM and high absenteeism rates of the SRM from the role have resulted in the SSM conducting the functions of both roles on many occasions. Recommendations have been made to address the issues identified. An accurate assessment of this role cannot be made

SENSITIVE

unless it is fully implemented and staffed as intended with improved technological support to assist decision making.

All recommendations made as a result of this audit have been made with a focus on driving consistency throughout the Districts and Communication Group, efficiently using resources and utilising technology to improve service delivery in line with the terms of reference.

S p p r e b t e p i n P o r m o r d

RECOMMENDATIONS

Structure and FTE of the Districts

Recommendation 1

AC MOS to determine the structure to be utilised to manage enquiries throughout the Districts pending DPM Stage 2.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 2

AC MOS to add FTE lost due to Part Time Agreements on the Service staffing reports.

Approved/Not Approved

Crime Coordination Section

District Intelligence Units (DIU)

Recommendation 3

AC MOS reviews the current rosters and staffing arrangements for District Intelligence Units to ensure Tactical Intelligence Officers are operationally focused whilst still providing support to the Districts.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 4

AC MOS to develop a District Intelligence Unit SOP to prescribe the day to day function of each role, time critical periods for staff and how to complete specific day to day tasks as per the updated DAM SOP.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 5

Director of IS&T creates and modifies existing searches for information required by District Intelligence Units on a daily basis to allow them more time to analyse crime.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 6

AC OSS to provide increased modular training courses specific to TIO's and attendance at specific courses is made mandatory.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 7

AC MOS determines Key Performance Indicators relating the activities of TIO's. These indicators are added to the SOP and reported on at the monthly Senior Management Team meetings within the Districts.

Approved/Not Approved

District Allocation Members (DAM)

Recommendation 8

Director of IS&T develops enhancements to Shield to automate the review function of active Whereabouts Flags every 6 months without any user input and relevant DAMS are notified of this review function.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 9

AC MOS to review the trial of the Northern District Shield process and make a determination regarding the need for CMU journals to be continued.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 10

AC MOS to consider removing the following functions of the DAM and amend the SOP accordingly:

- In collaboration with the DIU, provide information for daily briefings to patrol and CIB members in respect to ongoing crimes.
- Task and co-ordinate the collection of CCTV footage resulting from investigations.
- Expedite less serious crimes efficiently without compromising SAPOL's commitment to service delivery.
- Liaise with patrol supervisors and assist in the deployment of patrols, VCT and CIB member.
- Maintain a comprehensive crime management journal (pending the results of the Northern District trial).
- The DAM will be conversant with the activities of VCT targets and provide appropriate support.
- Crime Prevention will utilize the DAM as a resource to assist in identifying proactive crime reduction initiatives and assessing community needs.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 11

AC MOS update the Crime Coordination SOP to include Intervention Orders as a function of the DAM, to reference Crime Occurrences and any other relevant recommendations approved as a result of this report.

Approved/Not Approved

Human Source Management Liaison Officer (HSMLO)

Recommendation 12

AC OSS updates the General Order, Human Source Management, to reflect the CCS SOP and Crime Co-ordination Senior Sergeant PID.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 13

AC OSS provides training to the CCS Senior Sergeant relative to their role with the HSMLO.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 14

AC MOS update the Crime Co-ordination SOP to require HSMLO's across all of the Districts to provide the same report to the CCS Senior Sergeant on activity which is presented at the Senior Management Team Meeting.

Approved/Not Approved

Victim Contact Officer (VCO)

Recommendation 15

AC MOS to develop a standardised spreadsheet to record victim contact information to be used across MOS.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 16

AC MOS to develop a VCO SOP to prescribe the day to day function of the Victim Contact Officer as per the DAM SOP.

Approved/Not Approved

Operations Co-ordination Section

Missing Persons

Recommendation 17

AC MOS to develop a Missing Person SOP to prescribe the day to day function of each role of Missing Persons and how to complete specific day to day tasks as per the updated DAM SOP.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 18

An extra position is created in Southern District Missing Persons. AC MOS to determine how this position is created.

Approved/Not Approved

Brief Quality Control Officers

Recommendation 19

AC MOS to develop a BQCO SOP to prescribe the day to day function of each role of the BQCO and how to complete specific day to day tasks as per the updated DAM SOP.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 20

Director of IS&T provide all officers within the BQCO office Shield access as the supervisor to ensure the efficient functioning of the BQCO office in the absence of the supervisor.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 21

Director of IS&T develop a method of tracking files through Shield to ensure compliance with the Offence Streaming Model

Approved/Not Approved

Planning

Recommendation 22

AC MOS develop a Planning SOP to prescribe the day to day function of the Planning Office with the classification, documentation and communication for local events standardized and a standard method for recording events utilized as per the updated DAM SOP.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 23

An extra position is created in the Eastern District Planning Office. AC MOS to determine how this position is created.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 23

AC MOS ensures Emergency Response Plans are maintained.

Approved/Not Approved

Crime Prevention Section (CPS)

Recommendation 24

AC MOS directs Administration Support staff within the Districts complete tasks relating to Drug Diversions.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 25

AC MOS amends the Operations Co-ordination SOP to reflect the above recommendation if approved.

Approved/Not Approved

Training & Recruit Probationary Constable Coordinator

Recommendation 26

AC MOS consults with HRDB in relation to the alignment of Training and RPCC Co-ordinators to the Districts as opposed to HRDB, with Districts being responsible for the Administrative functions surrounding the role including HR21 and Workforce Central approvals, uniform orders and relieving the position from within the District as opposed to HRDB.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 27

AC MOS directs Administration Support staff within the Districts to comply with their SOP in relation to the data entry of training.

Approved/Not Approved

Investigation Support Desk

Recommendation 28

AC SEMS directs that vetting tasks relating to Forensic Procedures are only completed by the ISD D/Sgt on night shift where the applicants substantive supervisor is not available and the SOP is updated to reflect this change.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 29

The Commissioner makes a determination regarding the ongoing value INR's provide and whether they will continue to be produced. This will be dependent on the outcome of ability to rework the INR's to meet organisational needs.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 30

Director of IS&T develops methods of searching for similar crime facts based on Occurrence data.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 32

Director of IS&T develops a method of displaying real time crime mapping data on a live map for current analysis of crime by the ISD to be displayed on the Tactical Co-ordination Display (TCD) at Police Communications.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 33

AC SEMS updates the ISD SOP pending the approval of any of the recommendations.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 34

AC SEMS oversees the ISD working to their SOP for a further 9 months, with increased technological support as recommended above, after which a further audit is conducted.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 35

The event types requiring ISD review are themselves reviewed to focus on prioritising event types to be reviewed.

Approved/Not Approved

State Crime Assessment Centre (SCAC)

Recommendation 36

AC SEMS implements the full Communications Group Model, including the Communication Support Branch.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 37

Post the implementation of the full Communications Group Model, AC SEMS makes a determination as to the need of a Detective Senior Sergeant to be added to oversee the SCAC and the ISD.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 38

Director of IS&T, in consultation with AC SEMS, develops methods of retrieving KPI data relative to the SCAC. This includes the performance of team members within the SCAC.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 39

AC SEMS determines measurable Key Performance Indicators for the SCAC based on the results of the above recommendation and based on those indicators described in this report.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 40

Director of IS&T develops a method to represent key SCAC KPI data on a live "dashboard", similar to that used to monitor call volumes.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 41

AC SEMS develops training in relation to the assessment of Crime Occurrences and other tasks completed by the SCAC, to be provided to current members of the SCAC to drive consistency and improve the knowledge base of members. Training should be focused on assessment and risk analysis of Crime Occurrences.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 42

AC SEMS develops an induction package for new SCAC members that is documented and details the training given to new members.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 43

AC SEMS makes an assessment of the functions the SCAC is performing in line with the intent of the SCAC.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 44

AC MOS reports the outcome of the CFIS Allocation and Assessment Trial to the Operations Program Board.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 45

AC SEMS makes a determination in relation to the uploading of warrants by the SCAC:

Option 1: SCAC members upload all warrants as per the SOP outside of normal business hours as per the SOP.

Approved/Not Approved

Option 2 The SOP is amended to reflect the current practices relating FINS warrants being processed during business hours. ****Preferred Option****.

Approved/Not Approved

Supplemental Information

State Response Manager (SRM)

Recommendation 46

OC Communications Group review the SRM SOP and clearly delineate the role and function of the SRM and SSM to effectively utilize both positions.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 47

OC Communications Group add to the SRM SOP, stating that no more than 2 members should be moved in/out of the position at any one time.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 48

AC SEMS approve an updated SOP as described above.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 49

AC SEMS ensures the SRM role is fully staffed.

Approved/Not Approved

Recommendation 50

AC SEMS oversees the SRM/SSM working to their SOP for a further 9 months, fully staffed and with increased technological support as described in the ISD recommendation, after which a further audit is conducted in relation to the SRM SOP and role.

Approved/Not Approved

APPENDIX 3A: DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE UNIT (DIU)

DIU Productivity July – December 2018

Figure 1.1

Crime Co-ordination Section Statistics								
	EAST	P/WK	WEST	P/WK	NORTH	P/WK	SOUTH	P/WK
HSMLO Debriefs	27	1.1	37	1.5	74	3.1	37	1.5
TIO Debriefs	54	2.3	47	2.0	9	0.4	47	2.0
Intel subs submitted or value added intel	217	9.0	181	7.5	314	13.1	40	1.7
Intel subs submitted by District HSMLO	43	1.8	98	4.1	230	9.6	69	2.9
Street Checks submitted by Intel	52	2.2	52	2.2	120	5.0	103	4.3
VCO Victim Contacts July - Dec 18	1360		2665		2262		1833	
Southern District may not be adding their unit code when they value add to their intel subs, hence the low number.								

DIU Roster, Staffing and IO Vacancies

DIU's are staffed with 2 x IO's, 5 x TIO's, 1 x AS04 Intelligence Analyst and 1 x AS02 Intelligence Support Officer. Vacancies and absences of IO's are backfilled by TIO's. 1 x TIO is attached to the HSMLO office. Where TIO's are required to backfill IO's to meet business needs the operational capacity of the TIO's is significantly reduced. The current roster (as per the SOP) for the TIO's limits their capacity to provide coverage from 0700 – 2300, 7 days per week, with the staffing and rostering only providing TIO's to work in pairs 3 out of 7 days. There are also significant cultural issues present in the majority of the Districts, where TIO's are not leaving the office to obtain further intelligence in the field, choosing to remain in the office and complete other Tasks.

1 x TIO is attached to the HSMLO office, leaving a 4 remaining TIO's to cover 0700-2300, 7 days per week. The 2 week split roster (944) provides for TIO's working in pairs on 3 out of 7 days, being Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. The remainder of the time they are rostered solo on day and afternoon shift Thursday through to Sunday. Figure 2.1 shows the roster below as per the SOP.

Figure 1.2: TIO Roster

	Thur	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed
Week 1 (Member A)	O	O	A	A	A	A	A
Week 1 (Member B)	O	O	D	D	A	A	A
Week 2 (Member A)	D	D	O	O	D	D	D
Week 2 (Member B)	A	A	O	O	D	D	D

Working solo was raised an issue by TIO's and supervisors from all DIU's. Some TIO's stating they would not go out solo as it was a safety issue. Given the rostering

as described, this would and has resulted in TIO's very rarely leaving the office. There is no reason TIO's cannot go out of the office with officers from other areas such as VCT or CIB.

Due to IO vacancies, TIO's are often backfilling IO's to meet the daily business needs of the District, resulting in at least 1 of the 2 TIO's completing IO work and the other TIO being solo. Southern District is the only District that has been able to fill all of its IO positions. Whilst some Districts have been able to fill these vacancies with secondments, in others the TIO will backfill on a daily basis.

When other IO's go on leave or if TIO's or IO's relieve up into the Sgt or S/Sgt position, further absences of the TIO positions will occur. With 2 x IO positions, 1 Sgt position and the S/Sgt, there are 24 weeks in a year on annual leave alone where a further TIO will be lost to cover an IO position.

An analysis of rosters across the District was conducted as per Figure 2.2 below. An analysis of rosters from District DIU over a 3 month period has identified that on 37% of days this is not occurring and the majority of these days are on a Thursday, Friday, Saturday or Sunday afternoon shift.

Figure 1.3

DIU Staffing Assessment - 1/10/18 - 31/12/18				
STAFFING LEVEL	EASTERN	WESTERN	NORTHERN	SOUTHERN
Days where 0700 - 2300 not covered. (93 days)	43	40	32	30
Sat or Sun shifts where no coverage on both shifts	0	6	2	1
Shifts where there is 0 Intel on either D or A (186 shifts)	43	47	36	31
Number of above where it is a Thursday/Fri/Sa/Sun	27	36	35	26
Shifts where there is 1 staff member on D or A shift	66	56	58	43
Shifts where there is 1 or less on D or A	109	103	94	73

Staffing issues are compounded by cultural issues relating to TIO's not leaving the office (as will be discussed later in this report), TIO's not going out solo and by vacancies within the IO positions. Staffing and Rosters both need to be addressed in order to provide coverage between 0700 – 2300 and provide a reasonable level of service to the Districts.

Intelligence Submissions

A core daily function of the DIU supervisor is to vet and allocate Intelligence Submissions. The DIU supervisor allocates the Intelligence Submissions to IO's and TIO's to value add before further allocation as required. The process of value adding to an intelligence submission can be time consuming.

When the DIU supervisors is not working, TIO's and IO's will assess Intelligence Submissions to ensure that there is no actionable information relating to firearms. TIO's from across the Districts have sighted this Task as a reason for not going out into the field.

Whilst it is recognized Intel Submissions need to be checked for this content, there is a responsibility on the submitting officers to action information relative to firearms. This should not be a Task completed by TIO's over operational work on a daily basis.

TCG

Preparation for the TCG revolves around an assessment of crime for the last 24 hours and an analysis of that crime to be presented and discussed on a daily basis (including the weekends). Shield has impacted this process with many searches and analysis taking more time than with previous systems. It is anticipated that some of these inefficiencies will be reduced over time as enhancements are made with the assistance of Business Services Unit and Data Warehouse.

The daily TCG drives work within all of the DIU's from 0630 – 0930. To prepare for the daily TCG, DIU's utilize the work output of the 2 Intelligence officers (IO's), the Intelligence Analyst and Intelligence Support officer, with oversight and assistance by the Sergeant and Senior Sergeant. The involvement in this process by the Sergeant and Senior Sergeant varies throughout each District. In essence, up to 6 officers are being utilized to obtain this information every weekday morning in preparation for TCG. This period is a business critical for staff attendance and but is not addressed in the current SOP. It is recommended that this is added to the SOP as a business critical time where IO's and ASO's are required to be at work.

DIB

The development of the DIB is the other core Intelligence product produced by DIU. As this is a daily intelligence product this product should be produced by the IO's on day shift. The SOP does not prescribe this as a particular role of the IO, just that they will develop intelligence products as required.

Where the DIB should be created by the IO's on day shift, TIO's in some Districts are spending the majority of their afternoon shift attending to updating the DIB for the following day as opposed to gaining further intelligence out in the field. Northern District is the only District currently completing a DIB on weekends. The day shift TIO on the weekend completes this Task. In all of the Districts, due to the requirement of a daily TCG, the TIO will take on the role of an IO for the start of the shift to prepare and attend TCG and in most instances remain in the office as opposed to going out in the field.

Intelligence Business Process Review

This review is assessing the business processes of the Intelligence areas, including that of the Districts and the Investigative Support Desk, in an effort to streamline processes and improve efficiency. As part of their findings in consultation with District Intelligence units, observations have been made regarding the inefficient processes regarding the preparation for the TCG, the DIB and the underutilization Investigative Support Desk to provide up to date Intelligence Briefings to District and other intelligence units on a daily basis. However, as is discussed in the ISD component of this report, the ISD doesn't have the capacity and shouldn't be relied upon to provide a daily briefing on crime patterns that is relied upon by the District. They should be providing Intelligence on pattern Crime as it is occurring.

The SCAC assesses Occurrences based on priority and have a backlog of Occurrences. As a result of these factors crime patterns will generally not be observed by the SCAC. Only those Occurrences that are assessed as requiring further investigations are forwarded to the DAM for allocation. The DAM will generally not observe patterns of crime. Subsequently, the identification of all pattern crime rests with the DIU and the current method for obtaining information on reported crime for the last 24 hours is a time consuming and inefficient process. It is anticipated that more efficient processes will be identified and implemented as a result of the IBP

review. Further development needs to occur with BSU and IST to automate many of the searches completed by DIU on a daily basis to allow them to analyse data as opposed to spending large amounts of time collating it each day.

The implementation of the SCAC and DAM's have impacted the way in which crime is managed throughout the state, placing an emphasis on the DIU's and the ISD to identify pattern crime, analyse crime and drive the direction of Districts in response to managing crime on a day to day basis

Western District

The Western District DIU is staffed by

- TIO: 4.6 FTE (3 x part time 0.8, 0.9, 0.9 + 2 x FT, + 1 x OE TIO added in January.
- IO 1 x vacant. 1 x FTE
- AS04 and AS02 filled.
- Supervisor was a long term absence for an extended period.

The Western District DIU has not been functioning well. In addition to staffing issues identified in the summary, the DIU has had an IO position vacant since DPM inception with the supervisor absent for a long period due to injury. As a result of these absences in a small work group, the TIO's within the DIU have been filling in the IO role. Further impacting the area are 3 Flexible Working Arrangements (FWA) in the DIU where another 0.4FTE of a position is lost.

An audit of their roster identified that 40 days over a 93 day period had not been covered from 0700 – 2300 as per the SOP, with a day or an afternoon shift not covered as per Figure 2.2. This was the second highest number when compared the other District DIU's. An explanation of the reasons for this non compliance is included in the summary.

Preparation for the TCG and the DIB was identified as taking up the majority of time within the DIU on a daily basis, with the majority of time taken reviewing reported crime in the morning and providing some analysis.

The audit also identified significant cultural issues within the unit where, even when TIO's were not consumed with IO work on afternoon shift, they reverted back to monitoring CAD Taskings and other office related work as opposed to operationally going out into the field and identifying sources of external information and gaining a forward intelligence capability as per the SOP.

Warrants are being allocated by the DIU supervisor, however, they are not being tiered in line with General Orders. The supervisor is tiering them based on urgency and allocating them to the relevant S/Sgt for further allocation.

The auditing of DNA/Fingerprint/Operation Secure/other corporate requirements was being completed to some degree. The DAM will conduct an audit Case Management Actions every month. A MOS report is sent out weekly in relation to all outstanding DNA/Fingerprint, however, no further auditing is completed by the Crime Co-ordination section in relation to these Tasks. They are left to the managers of the areas they are allocated to ensure completion.

Southern District

The Southern District DIU is staffed by

- TIO: 5 x FTE + 1 x OE.
- IO: 2 x FTE.
- AS04 and AS02 filled.

Unlike other Districts the Southern District DIU has been fully staffed. An audit of their roster identified that 30 days over a 93 day period had not been covered from 0700 – 2300 as per the SOP, with a day or an afternoon shift not covered. This was the lowest number of days when compared to the other Districts and is indicative of the area being fully staffed, however, it also indicates that with a full complement of staff the coverage is limited.

Preparation for the TCG and the DIB was identified as taking up the majority of time within the DIU on a daily basis, with the majority of time taken reviewing reported crime in the morning and providing some analysis.

As with the other Districts the audit also identified significant cultural issues within the unit where, on afternoon shift, TIO's reverted back to preparing a DIB and completing other office related work as opposed to operationally going out into the field and identifying sources of external information and gaining a forward intelligence capability. There was a particular emphasis on the DIB and also on the review of Intelligence Submissions relating to firearms actions as in the summary.

The DAM allocate the warrants to the Senior Sergeants based on area. SCT warrants go to the Volume Crime Team and all other warrants are allocated to patrols.

The DAM conduct an audit of outstanding Crime Stoppers actions on case management every Friday for the Weekly Service Report. Similarly to Western District, a MOS report is sent out weekly in relation to all outstanding DNA/Fingerprint Tasks, however, no further auditing is completed by the Crime Co-ordination section in relation to these Tasks. They are left to the managers of the areas they are allocated to ensure completion.

Eastern District

The Eastern District DIU is staffed by

- TIO: 5 x FTE
- IO 2 x vacant. Both positions currently filled by secondment (since October 2018)
- AS04 and AS02 filled.

Eastern District has been unable to fill their 2 x IO positions since DPM. However, they have filled these positions with secondments since October 2018. An audit of their roster identified that 43 days over a 93 day period had not been covered from 0700 – 2300 as per the SOP, with a day or an afternoon shift not covered. This was the highest number of days when compared to the other Districts, however, this is indicative of the staffing and roster.

Qualitative data from interviews suggest the TIO's are spending more time in the field operationally than at base in line with the SOP. This is pushed by the CCS S/Sgt of Eastern District. The cultural issues present in the other Districts, particularly with TIO's, was not observed in the Eastern District. However it was still noted that some

members stated they will go out solo, others will not, sighting OHS&W risks. This has been an issue raised by TIO's from other Districts.

Preparation for the TCG and the DIB was identified as taking up the majority of time within the DIU on a daily basis. However, the manager of the CCS indicates that analysis of the crime is occurring as opposed to reporting on crime.

Existing Case Management files are being forwarded onto the relevant Senior Sergeant for allocation and left with them to manage. The number of Case Management files and DNA/Fingerprint Tasks is provided by the CCS manager via the Weekly Service Report. There is no further oversight or auditing function being completed by the CCS Manager.

All other Tasks in relation to DNA and fingerprint Tasks on Shield are being allocated to the relevant area. Shield has created issues surrounding the management of these Tasks as discussed in the DAM summary. A MOS report is sent out weekly in relation to all outstanding DNA/Fingerprint Tasks. Recommendations surrounding Tasks types should ensure that these actions can be audited effectively and also managed by operational managers. The SOP does not prescribe how the audits are to be performed, how frequently or how the results will be reported and managed.

Warrants are tiered and allocated by the CCS S/Sgt. This role is soon to be taken over by the DAM.

Northern District

The Northern District DIU is staffed by

- TIO: 5 x FTE
- IO x 1 (1 x IO vacant since inception).
- AS04 and AS02 filled.

Northern District has been unable to fill 1 x IO positions since DPM. However, they have recently filled this position short term with a secondment. An audit of their roster identified that 32 days over a 93 day period had not been covered from 0700 – 2300 as per the SOP, with a day or an afternoon shift not covered. This was the second lowest number of days when compared to the other Districts.

As with the other Districts the audit also identified significant cultural issues within the unit where, on afternoon shift, TIO's reverted back to completing office related work as opposed to operationally going out into the field and identifying sources of external information and gaining a forward intelligence capability. The CCS S/Sgt has provided training and guidance to try and change this culture.

Preparation for the TCG and the DIB was identified as taking up the majority of time within the DIU on a daily basis, with the majority of time taken reviewing reported crime in the morning and providing some analysis. Northern District are the only District completing the DIB on the weekend to provide guidance and information to frontline officers over the weekends. This reduces the capacity of the TIO as discussed in the summary.

The Crime Co-ordination Section doesn't manage any Case Management. The allocation and management of case management actions is completed by the VCT Senior Sergeant. This includes completing the information required for the weekly service report. Operation Secure Tasks are allocated and left to the Operations S/Sgt to manage.

Northern District have stopped completing the CMU journal. Northern District are conducting a trial utilizing Shield only and ensuring the correct details are put in the

Shield occurrence to allow for the Shield download to have the same functionality without duplicating work.

Warrants are managed by the DIU supervisor, this Task is to be allocated to the DAM as part of the new DAM SOP agreed upon by the Crime Co-ordination managers. The CCS SOP will need to be updated to reflect this.

Supplemental information

APPENDIX 3B: DAM'S

Figure 1.4

DAM SOP Compliance				
SOP Requirement	EASTERN	WESTERN	NORTHERN	SOUTHERN
Receive, triage and allocate assessed occurrences/Crime Stoppers/Drug Information/Op Secuer from the SCAC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Compile briefing papers and media releases (as directed)	No	No	No	No (occasional media release)
In collaboration with the DIU, prepare the Weekly Service Report	Yes	Yes	No (intel)	Yes (limited)
Monitor Radio Taskings	No	No	No	Yes
Maintain CMU journal.	No	No	No	No
Review the warrant system (PWIN) and allocate respective District warrants to appropriate District sections	No (intel)	No (intel)	No (intel)	Yes
Liaise with patrol supervisors and assist in the deployment of patrols, volume crime teams and CIB members	No	No	No (intel)	No
Provide feedback to operational members in respect to PIR's submitted.	No	No	No	Yes
Receive, assess and forward all DNA and forensic (fingerprint) investigations to the DIU for intelligence analysis to identify any connection with other offences of a same/similar nature, and on return to the DAM, allocate for investigation	Yes (allocate only)	Yes (allocate only)	Yes (allocate only)	Yes (allocate only)
Audit the timely completion of Crime Stopper, DNA and Fingerprint actions	No	No	No	No
Manage and review wanted flags for suspects listed on PIRs	No	No	No	No
Expedite less serious crimes efficiently	No	No	No	No
Act as a contact point for victims of crime when the VCO is not available	No	No	No	Yes
Task and co-ordinate the collection of CCTV footage	No	No	No	No
Receive and allocate enquiries issued by Expiation Notice Branch related to District POI's or recidivist offenders in relation to unlicensed and disqualified drivers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Process requests for information from/to external agencies (SA Housing, DCS etc)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liaise with the DIU to facilitate and ensure timely information flow	No	No	No	Yes
In collaboration with the DIU, provide information for daily briefings to patrol and CIB members in respect to ongoing crimes	No	No	No	No
Provide a report to the District TCG meetings per the requirements of the District O/C	Yes (IO's)	Yes (IO's)	No	Yes (IO's)
Ensure domestic abuse reports (DAR) received are forwarded to the relevant CFIS, with due regard given to the assessed risk as a matter of priority	Yes (SCAC direct CFIS)	Yes (SCAC direct)	Yes (SCAC direct CFIS)	Yes
Will liaise with the Patrol supervisors	No	No	No	Yes (needs basis)
The DAM is responsible for managing hardcopy records including archiving and retrieval where they exist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Crime Prevention will utilise the DAM as a resource to assist in identifying proactive crime reduction initiatives and assessing community needs.	No	No	No	No
The DAM will be conversant with the activities of the VCT targets and provide appropriate support.	No	No	No	No
Allocation of Intervention Orders and auditing completion. (not in SOP)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Western District

The Western District DAM is staffed by 2.8 FTE. The DAM is functioning well. The DAM is responsible for the collation of the Weekly Service report. Intel may assist over the weekend, when available, to add to this report for submission on Monday. As per Figure 1.1 there are a number of functions listed in the SOP that the Western District DAM are not completing, however, the way in which they are functioning is generally consistent with the DAM's from the other Districts.

In addition to those duties listed in the SOP, the Western DAM are also receiving all Intervention Orders from PIMS each day, adding to the TCG spreadsheet and allocating to the appropriate S/Sgt for further allocation and service. The reasoning behind this is discussed in the summary.

The Western District DAM is effectively functioning with 3 members. All members have extensive previous experience in Crime Management Units (CMU). Comment was made by DAM members regarding the addition of the supervisor to manage the DAM's and provide additional daily oversight and advice.

The Western District allocation system for Occurrences is based on suburb only. Equal allocation of occurrences has been achieved by dividing the suburbs between the three stations based on the District Policing Team suburbs for the DPM Stage 2. Other DAM's allocate based on suburb and the time of offence. This will be standardized as part of the DAM SOP.

The DAM is not completing the functions as listed in the SOP as per Figure 2.1. Reasons behind these functions not being completed are discussed in the summary.

Eastern District

The Eastern District DAM is staffed by 4 FTE, (1 x Sgt Position OE in the DAM). The DAM is functioning well. The DAM is responsible for the collation of the Weekly Service Report. The DDI or on duty officer adds to this report over the weekend. The DAM finalise the Weekly Service Report on Monday for submission.

In addition to those duties listed in the SOP the Eastern DAM are also receiving all Intervention Orders from PIMS each day, adding to the TCG spreadsheet and allocating to S/Sgt for further allocation and service. The reasoning behind this is discussed in the summary.

The Eastern District is effectively functioning with 3 members and an OE Sergeant. The OE Sergeant assists with the management of other Crime Co-ordination Section Tasks as directed by the Crime Co-ordination Section Senior Sergeant. Comment was made by DAM members regarding the addition of a permanent Sergeant to assist in the supervision of the area, in particular to assist in interactions with other supervisors within the District regarding investigations and decisions made.

The Eastern District had experienced issues surrounding uneven distribution of investigations throughout the District based on their suburb allocation system. The Eastern District did not utilize the DPM Stage 2 suburbs as Western District has. The DAM SOP prescribes an allocation system which will be adopted by all Districts. This system should assist in the more even distribution of investigations throughout the District.

The DAM is not completing the functions as listed in the SOP as per Figure 2.1. Reasons behind these functions not being completed are discussed in the summary.

Southern District

The Southern District DAM is staffed by 3 FTE, however, 1 member has taken extended periods of leave over the last 5 months. The DAM is functioning well but due to one member on extended leave, increased pressure is placed on the remaining members. 2 members was not a sufficient amount of staff to manage the workload on an ongoing basis. This staffing issue had not been addressed locally. Staff were of the opinion that 3 FTE was sufficient to staff the DAM

The DAM is responsible for collating a small amount of information in relation the Weekly Service Report. The Southern DAM are reviewing and allocating warrants where no other DAM is.

In addition to those duties listed in the SOP the Southern DAM are also receiving all Intervention Orders from PIMS each day, adding to the TCG spreadsheet and allocating to S/Sgt for further allocation and service. The reasoning behind this is discussed in the summary

The DAM is not completing the functions as listed in the SOP as per Figure 2.1. Reasons behind these functions not being completed are discussed in the summary.

Northern District

The Northern District DAM is staffed by 6 members. However due to a Part time agreement, Long Term Absence and other HR impacts the effective FTE is 4.63.

The Northern DAM has cultural, performance and Human Resource issues which are affecting their ability to function. The Northern DAM do not manage District Intervention Orders or contribute to the development of the Weekly Service Report as other DAM's do. These responsibilities have been given to other areas to manage, subsequently increasing the other areas workload.

As per Figure 1.1 there are a number of functions listed in the SOP that the Northern District DAM are not completing. Reasons behind these functions not being completed are discussed in the summary.

The CCS Manager and OE DAM Sergeant have led the development of a DAM specific SOP. In part, this was due to the need to provide increased instruction and guidance to staff to improve performance, but also to drive consistency across the Districts. CCS S/Sgt's from all of the Districts have developed this SOP and will ensure consistent and standardized practice throughout MOS.

APPENDIX 3C: HSMLO

The HSMLO reports to the CCS S/Sgt. In all of the Districts, 1 of the 5 TIO positions is attached to the HSMLO and works in conjunction with the HSMLO. HSMLO's and the attached TIO's are generally working the approved roster as per the SOP, but will change shifts as the role dictates to meet with Human Sources.

The CIB Manager (Detective Chief Inspector) has an auditing function regarding the HSMLO and audits contact sheets and monetary reconciliation. In the Southern District this is conducted by the Detective Inspector.

Each HSMLO office has a controller within HSMS, who assists in the management of risk, guidance and resources in relation to Human Source Management.

As per the SOP, the CCS S/Sgt is required to "ensure strict compliance with General Order, Human Source Management, of all members within the section and facilitate information exchange with Human Source Management Section." However, the CCS Senior Sergeant does not audit any of the information relating to Human Sources and has limited to no ability to ensure compliance with this General Order in relation to the HSMLO's. Further, except for those CCS S/Sgt have previous experience/training in Human Source Management, the CCS S/Sgt have, in general, had no training in this area and would need to be trained if they were to have an understanding of Human Source Management and be able to ensure compliance with the GO.

The CCS S/Sgt manages the administrative aspect of the HSMLO's regarding rosters, Workforce Central and leave. The liaison between the HSMLO and the CCS S/Sgt varies between Districts. In Northern and Southern District the HSMLO will advise the CCS S/Sgt of the suburb and when they are going to meet with a Human Source and in Eastern District anecdotal evidence from the Eastern the CCS S/Sgt suggests he plays a more active part in directing the HSMLO as a result of TCG actions on a day to day basis. Very little liaison and supervision occurs in the Western District.

In the Northern District the HSMLO provides a summary each month to the CCS S/Sgt of their activity. The same occurs in Southern District. In Western District no summary is provided. The way in which the report is collated and provided differs between Northern and Southern District.

Northern District, Eastern District and Western District all have a full complement of 2 x FTE HSMLO and are further staffed with a TIO HSMLO. Southern District have had 1 x HSMLO vacant for approximately 2 months.

APPENDIX 4A: MISSING PERSONS

Table 1.1 displays the figures relating to Missing Person Report (MPR) across each of the Districts. The table also displays the number of GOM MPR. Whilst the number of non-GOM MPR's are similar across all of the Districts, Southern District have the largest number of missing GOM children. They account for approximately 50% of the GOM MPR across MOS and generally have 150+ more total MPR than any other District. Southern District had an average 329 GOM MP a month from August 2018 to January 2019 and 394 total MP a month over this period, compared to Western District who averaged 57 and 124 respectively. To manage the extra workload Southern District have 1 x OE FTE in this position.

Figure 1.5

Month	District	MPR (GoM)	Absent Report (GoM)	Total GOM MPRs	Total MOS MPR	NON GOM MAPR	MOS GOM MPR as a % of all MOS
August 2018	Northern	45	53	98	180	82	54%
	Southern	88	281	369	451	82	82%
	Eastern	52	47	99	214	115	46%
	Western	23	35	58	112	54	52%
	Total	208	416	624	957	333	65%
September 2018	Northern	58	37	95	150	55	63%
	Southern	109	271	380	437	57	87%
	Eastern	46	38	84	176	92	48%
	Western	18	26	44	107	63	41%
	Total	231	372	603	870	267	69%
October 2018	Northern	32	43	75	140	65	54%
	Southern	201	140	341	401	60	85%
	Eastern	50	62	112	189	77	59%
	Western	36	23	59	126	67	47%
	Total	319	286	587	856	269	69%
November 2018	Northern	42	86	128	185	57	69%
	Southern	143	111	254	334	80	76%
	Eastern	34	83	117	215	98	54%
	Western	29	27	56	133	77	42%
	Total	248	307	555	867	312	64%
December 2018	Northern	49	111	160	230	70	70%
	Southern	152	148	300	356	56	84%
	Eastern	40	100	140	217	77	65%
	Western	24	36	60	138	78	43%
	Total	265	395	660	941	281	70%
January 2019	Northern	44	82	126	202	76	62%
	Southern	190	139	329	384	55	86%
	Eastern	37	107	144	223	79	65%
	Western	33	33	66	130	64	51%
	Total	304	361	665	939	274	71%
TOTAL		1575	2137	3694	5430	1736	68%

Figure 5.2 illustrates the average amount of time a MPR remained open pre and post DPM. The table illustrates that the average time has remained approximately the same, however, the implementation of the Missing Persons sections within the Districts will ensure increased risk mitigation in this area. The figures contained in this table are for information only and shouldn't be relied upon for decision making.

They were obtained using raw data to gain an indication of the impact on the time an MPR has remained open since the implementation of DPM and the Missing Persons Sections within the Districts to determine if there has been a significant change.

Figure 1.6

Period	Month	Missing Person Reports	Average Minutes	Average Hours	Average Days
Pre-DPM (5 Jan - 4 Jul)	Jan	840	1513	25.2	1.05
	Feb	955	1618	27.0	1.12
	Mar	1083	1481	24.7	1.03
	Apr	947	1394	23.2	0.97
	May	1009	1418	23.6	0.98
	Jun	1017	1376	22.9	0.96
	Jul	118	1791	29.8	1.24
	Total	5969	1471	24.5	1.02
Post DPM (5 Jul - 4 Jan)	Jul	793	1838	30.6	1.28
	Aug	1104	1324	22.1	0.92
	Sep	1020	1480	24.7	1.03
	Oct	1015	1476	24.6	1.03
	Nov	1007	1529	25.5	1.06
	Dec	1170	1267	21.1	0.88
	Jan	228	1466	24.4	1.02
	Total	6337	1465	24.4	1.02
Total		12306	1468	24.5	1.02

Whilst all MP officers are complying with the SOP, the way in which each MP section operates and reports to management on daily basis differs throughout the Districts. The SOP does not prescribe how day to day Tasks are to be completed. An example of this is the way in which information regarding active MPR's is passed on to night shift patrol supervisors when the MP unit complete their shift. Whilst District MP sections do liaise regularly in relation to locating MP, information sharing on District practices doesn't appear to occur. The utilization of Facebook is an example of this. Southern District utilize Facebook to actively speak with, reduce risk and locate MP on a daily basis and have a Southern District Missing Person Unit Facebook page. Northern District utilize Facebook to observe activities only and Western do not utilize Facebook at all.

Eastern District

Eastern District MP Officers are complying with the SOP. From August 2018 – December 2018 they have seen an increase in the number of GOM MPR's within their District rise from 99 in August 2018 to 144 in January 2019. Eastern District have a similar number of not GOM MPR as Northern District. Eastern District had an average 116 GOM MPR's a month over this period and 206 total MPR's a month over this period.

The Eastern District MP are fully staffed with 3 FTE.

Eastern District have proposed and are currently trialing a process where a more pragmatic approach is adopted regarding the need to raise an MPR for a person who has left a Mental Health Facility or treatment centre. This trial was previously conducted and is being run again to gather data to prove its benefit. Eastern District has 3 mental health care facilities in its area. Where the person is not at risk and

doesn't pose a risk to the community, a MPR will not be taken and the person will instead be flagged on Shield so that if the person is located by police they can be returned to the treatment centre. PCO 2018/2783 refers. This is a 6 month trial beginning in March 2019 and is an example of a problem solving technique being used in Eastern District to reduce the workload relating to missing persons from those areas.

Eastern District have regular liaison with other MP units from throughout MOS and work closely with homeless shelters, the hospitals, DCP and other non government agencies to locate MP. MP officers also utilize social media to assist in locating missing people but do not interact with the children via Facebook.

Qualitative information from the Operations Co-ordinator in Eastern District suggests approximately 40% of the Operations Co-ordinators time is consumed by Missing persons, liaising with MP officers, risk managing and presenting the information at TCG. Concerns were raised regarding the supervision of staff. Benefits of having a supervisor sighted included improved risk management of missing persons and an improved ability to engage with stakeholders in an attempt to reduce repeat instances of absconding, particularly with GOM children. In addition to supervision, increased staffing in this area was raised by management as there is no inbuilt relief into the roster and relief for the positions must come from response.

Southern District

Southern District MP Officers are complying with the SOP. From August 2018 – January 2019 they have seen a slight decrease in the number of GOM MPR's within the District from 369 in August 2018 to 329 in January 2019. However, they account for 50% of the GOM MPR across MOS and generally have 150+ more total MPR than any other District. Southern District had an average 329 GOM MPR a month over this period and 394 total MP a month over this period.

Due to the work volume, the Southern District MP have been staffed with 1 OE member in addition to the 3 FTE already filling the positions.

Southern District conducted the initial MP trial within LSA structure in which a Sergeant oversaw the running of the MP Unit. Benefits identified from this trial included the ability of the supervisor to better engage with stakeholders to reduce instances of reoffending, allowing the MP officers to focus on the day to day investigations to locate MP and improved risk management of MP Reports. Currently the MP officers will attend the case conferences with DCP and other agencies regarding particular children that are regularly going missing.

Southern District liaise with other MP Units across MOS and work closely with DCP and other non government agencies to locate MP. Southern District utilize a Missing Persons Team Facebook account to speak with MP, generally GOM children, reducing risk and often reducing the time it takes to locate MP. This is an initiative that is not used by the other MP Units throughout the Districts.

Staffing and supervision were both raised as an issue in relation to the MP Units in Southern District due to their workload. The workload of this area, is far above that of the other Districts.

Western District

Western District MP Officers are complying with the SOP. Western District MP Unit have far less GOM MPR's than any other District, averaging 57 GOM MPR's a month over the last 6 months with a total average of 124 MPR's a month.

Western District MP is fully staffed with 3 FTE.

Western District liaise with other MP Units across MOS and work closely with DCP and other non government agencies to locate MP. Unlike Southern District MP they do not utilize resources such as Facebook to assist with locating MP. The Operations Co-ordinator presents at TCG each day without the assistance of a MP officer. In other Southern District a MP officer presents with the Operations Co-ordinator and in Northern District the Operations Co-ordinator presents by exception at TCG (only mentions a MP if there is a particular identified risk),

Although Western District has the least amount of MP across all of the Districts, the supervision of staff was raised as an issue, with the Operations Co-ordinator stating that a large portion of their daily workload is consumed with the supervision and management of the MP.

Northern District

Northern District MP Officers are complying with the SOP. Northern District MP are averaging 117 GOM MPR a month and 185 total MPR per month from August 2018 to January 2019. The number of GOM MPR has seen a slight increase in number of over these months.

Northern District MP are staffed with 3.4 FTE (1 x Full time and 4 x Pt time). They currently have 1 return to work member also assisting 4 days per week resulting in a total of 4.4FTE.

Pre DPM Northern District, had 1 total FTE working day shift Monday to Friday to assist in locating MP in a similar manner to is currently utilized under the DPM.

Northern District have had particular issues with 3 GOM placement centers where children within the residents were committing offences, causing property damage and disrupting the accommodation. Northern District MP have worked with DCP and carers from within the houses to take positive action, arresting those committing offences and separating the children who were causing the issues in an effort to reduce offending which proved successful. Whilst this did not directly relate to MP it is an example of the unit working with stakeholders on an identified issue as part of their function.

The Operations Co-ordinator presents daily at the TCG, where the MPR's are discussed by exception. Only those people that are identified as at risk are raised for further discussion at the TCG. Supervision of staff and the associated risks with managing the MP Unit was raised as an issue by the Operations Co-ordinator as per the summary.

APPENDIX 4B: PLANNING

The table below shows the number of Major and Special Events completed by each District over a 6 month period since DPM. Due to the different manner in which events are classified and managed within District, statistics relating to local events would not be comparable. Anecdotal information suggests that the Eastern District have the largest workload by far where Northern District have very little work in comparison. These statistics were provided by each planning office.

District Planning Statistics July 2018 - December 2019				
EVENT TYPE	EASTERN	WESTERN	NORTHERN	SOUTHERN
Special	14	0	0	1
Major	7	5	0	0

Eastern District

Planning office is staffed by 2 FTE. (1 x Sgt, 1 x SC)

The planning office are complying with the SOP in terms of planning for events, however, was finding it difficult to manage the workload. Tasks that were deemed to have a lower priority, such as Emergency Response Plans, were not being completed. A restricted duties member is currently updating the ERP's as many were overdue.

Debriefing operations was dependent on the size and importance placed on the operation. For large events debriefs were occurring, however, the Planning Sergeant recognized that the attention given to both planning for events and debriefs was severely limited due to workload and the limited capacity of 2 members.

Eastern District had completed 26 Operations Orders since DPM with 14 Special Events, 7 Major Events (not managed by EMES), 8 local events, 56 event advices and 58 patrol attendance required (DPTS).

Eastern District has an up to date list of 62 ERP's which they are responsible for updating and have 1 Business Continuity Plan that covers the 5 police buildings. The Emergency Response Plans were not all up to date. 31 of the 32 listed on the EMES intranet site were overdue. These were in the process of being updated.

Eastern District Administrative Workforce Planners are allocating staffing for events based on the staffing recommendations made by the Planning Office.

Eastern District appeared to have efficient and streamlined processes in place to manage work required of them within their District. The workload and staffing limits their capacity to provide service delivery in all aspects of their operation.

Western District

The Planning office is staffed by 2 FTE. (1 x Sgt, 1 x SC) For the first 6 months of the DPM the Planning office had 1 x OE member to assist.

Western District had completed 18 Operations Orders (some of which are tactical Operation Orders) since DPM with 0 Special Events, 5 Major Events, 13 local events with operation order, 157 event advices and 147 patrol attendance required (DPTS). This would include concerts at the Entertainment Centre or ships coming into outer harbor.

Western District has a total of 44 Emergency Response Plans. The planners maintain a list of the ERP's and their due dates. Over the summer months when it is busy, reviewing ERP's are a low priority when compared to other planning. 33 of the 44 are critical infrastructure ERP's.

An audit of the ERP's on the EMES intranet page revealed 2 ERP's were out of date in Western District out of a total 44.

Forward Commanders are provided with information to provide to management regarding a debrief for an operation. On other occasions the debrief will come to the planning office regarding debrief points for the planning process. For large operations the planning office will compile debrief points and present them to management.

Southern District

The Southern District Planning office is staffed by 2 FTE. (1 x Sgt, 1 x SC)

The Planning office was complying with the SOP in terms of planning for events, however, was unaware of all of the ERP they would be accountable for as part of Southern District with the amalgamation of 2 LSA's and were currently going through a process of reviewing the ERP's that had been allocated to them as part of the Southern District with EMES. An audit of the ERP's on the EMES intranet page revealed 29 ERP's were out of date in Southern District out of a total 43.

Southern District had completed 26 Operation Orders since DPM with 1 Special Event, 0 Major Events and 54 local events. The way in which their local events are recorded differs to the way in which Eastern District record their local events. Eastern District only record Local Events for those events that required patrol attendance. Southern District included events that may only be for attention or advice. Similarly, the Operation Orders completed by Southern District included local Tactical Operation Orders which differed from other Districts.

At a local level, planners within the office would have a different view of the response required for certain events.

Debriefing of events was not occurring within a timely manner. Direction had recently been given to the planning office regarding timely initial debriefs of operations at TCG immediately following the operation.

Northern District

The Northern District Planning office is staffed by 2 FTE (2 x Sergeants)

The Planning office was complying with the SOP in terms of planning for events. The planning office has completed 2 Operation Orders since DPM. Event types that were planned for were not broken down into special, major or local events. An assessment of the records revealed 0 special, 0 major events and 36 local events. The majority of other planned events linked to other corporate operations and were detailed in a document named a PPS (proactive policing strategy). The Northern District were the only District using this particular document.

An audit of the ERP's on the EMES intranet page revealed 10 ERP's were out of date in Northern District out of a total 33.

Northern District planners were completing debriefs at the request of the District Commander. Verbal debriefs were given regarding statistics for corporate operations results.

APPENDIX 4C: CRIME PREVENTION SECTION

Eastern District

The Eastern District Crime Prevention Section is staffed by 3 FTE (1 x Sgt, 2 x Const/SC). They hold one vacancy.

The Eastern District CPS engage with schools, community groups, councils and other stakeholders as part of the crime prevention initiatives. Due to the demographics of the District they have a large involvement with the universities, providing educational talks to international students regarding security and safety and engage with businesses within the CBD regarding particular issues.

They manage crime prevention initiatives including; Neighbourhood watch, Think you know program and Blue Light. They don't run a living skills program due to resources. They manage 35 NHW areas. They run displays in Rundle Mall and Tea Tree Plaza Shopping Centre, pushbike engraving days and complete business security audits.

Eastern District were not keeping up with the requirement to issue Drug Diversions due to their vacancy, prioritizing other activities.

A key issue raised by Eastern District was their ability to effectively conduct their role without the ability to change shift, reducing their service delivery to stakeholders in the community.

Western District

The Western District Crime Prevention Section is staffed by 1 x Sgt + 2 FTE. 1 x Long Term Absence (LTA) due to relieving.

The Western District CPS engage with schools, community groups, councils and other stakeholders as part of their crime prevention initiatives. They manage crime prevention initiatives including Neighbourhood Watch, Think you know programs, Blue Light events and the Blue Light Living Skills program. They also assist with high visibility policing in shopping centres and Glenelg during peak times. Western District have provided living schools programs to schools within the District to assist in managing issues identified within the school that were impacting police resources and are also running a program at an international school where particular issues have been raised.

Western District CPS manage the Drug Diversions within the District.

A key issue raised by Western District was their ability to effectively conduct their role without the ability to change shift, reducing their service delivery to stakeholders in the community.

Southern District

The Southern District Crime Prevention Section is staffed by 1 x Sgt + 3FTE + 0.5OE.

The Southern District CPS engage with schools, community groups, councils and other community stakeholders as part of their role and manage a number of Crime Prevention initiatives including; Neighbourhood Watch, Police link at Flinders Hospital, Think you know program, Blue Light camps/events and the Blue Light

Living Skills Program. CPS staff do not attend the NHW divisional meetings as they are held out of hours.

The Southern CPS also check overnight occurrences and conduct security audits of residential and commercial premises as required.

Southern CPS are not completing Drug Diversions. This is completed by Administration Support Officers.

A key issue raised by Southern District was their ability to effectively conduct their role without the ability to change shift, reducing their service delivery to stakeholders in the community.

Northern District

The Northern District Crime Prevention Section is staffed by 1 x Sgt + 3.2 FTE

The Northern District CPS engage with schools, community groups councils and other community stakeholders as part of their role and manage a number of Crime Prevention initiatives including; Neighbourhood Watch and the Think you know program. Northern CPS does not have a Blue Light program. CPS members attend divisional NHW meetings, scheduling them during the day. Due to the danger of bushfires within the District the CPS have a focus on Operation Nomad Crime Prevention activities, providing training and information to community stakeholders.

Northern District do not conduct youth camps or the Blue Light Living Skills program but do provide a Youth Education Program to schools. CPS check overnight occurrences and conduct business security audits of premises as required.

The Northern District CPS complete Drug Diversions. This task has been handed back and forth from District administration.

A key issue raised by Northern District was their ability to effectively conduct their role without the ability to change shift, reducing their service delivery to stakeholders in the community.

APPENDIX 4D: TRAINING AND RPCC

Eastern District

Eastern District Training and RPCC is staffed with 2 x FTE Sergeants and are complying with the SOP.

The 2 officers in this role share responsibility for training and RPCC.

As of the 25/2/19 Eastern District had 62 Probationary Constables, 102 Field Tutors and 81 active field tutors. The majority of work with the Probationary Constables is related performance management issues.

For Cycle 6 2018 Eastern District had a training compliance of approximately 90% across the training required face to face training. To achieve these results they are running a large amount of catch up sessions and having to run up to 60 sessions per cycle to capture members. There are issues in training staff due to the different rosters throughout the District between Grenfell Street, Holden Hill, Norwood and CIB and the 7 week roster provides them with limited opportunity to learn and review the next training cycle with no break in between. In other Districts, such as Western Districts, all response members are on a 5 week roster making the co-ordination of training easier.

In addition to running corporate training the trainers facilitate training for local issues surrounding body worn cameras, cell extractions and blue team processes.

Administration Officers are completing first aid, imost and dry drill scheduling and data entry. Trainers data enter all of the training attendance records. Compliance is reported on through the PD160 process.

A monthly report is provided to the Senior Management Team regarding the training compliance, the number of P/C's and cadets coming into to the District on out-phase.

To add to the workload, the current officers in these roles moved into the position at the beginning of the DPM, had limited handover and have been developing processes to improve efficiency in the role.

Western District

Western District Training and RPCC is staffed with 2 x FTE Sergeants and are complying with the SOP.

The 2 officers in this role share responsibility for training and RPCC.

As of the 14/2/19 Western District had 88 Probationary Constables, 115 Field Tutors and 78 active field tutors. The majority of work with the Probationary Constables is related performance management issues.

A monthly report is provided to the Senior Management Team regarding the training compliance, the number of P/C's and their progress in the probation, the number of field tutors, the Field Tutor allocation to phase 6 P/C, first aid and IMOST compliance, POMP status and cadets coming into to the District on out phase.

In addition to corporate training Western District will facilitate training on local issues within the District as identified.

Where other Districts complete their Field Tutor accreditation on yearly basis in January, Western District complete this accreditation as required on a monthly basis. This results in the workload being spread out throughout the year.

Training officers are completing the dry drill, IMOST and training data entry. Scheduling for first aid and IMOST is completed by administration.

In addition to running training within the District, the trainers facilitate training for Northern Traffic and accreditation for Field Tutors within this section. Southern District cater for Southern Traffic. This adds an increased workload to the number of staff that need to be trained each cycle.

Southern District

Southern District Training and RPCC is staffed with 2 x FTE Sergeants and are complying with the SOP.

The 2 officers in this role share responsibility for training and RPCC.

As of the 28/2/19 Southern District had 48 Probationary Constables, 152 Field Tutors and 119 active field tutors. The majority of work with the Probationary Constables is related performance management issues.

A monthly report is provided to the Senior Management Team regarding upcoming training, upcoming local training the number of P/C's, the number of field tutors, Dry Drills compliance and cadets in the District.

In addition to corporate training Southern District will facilitate training on local issues within the District as identified. Recent local training has been of particular importance to ensure consistency across the District.

Southern District sighted issues surrounding the time required to data enter training records. The Training officers were managing the data entry of IMOST, dry drills and training as well as the scheduling. Southern District are looking at handing over the data entry of training and IMOST to administration staff.

Northern District

Northern District Training and RPCC is staffed with 2 x FTE Sergeants and are complying with the SOP.

The 2 officers in this role share responsibility for training and RPCC.

As of the 7/3/19 Northern District had 83 Probationary Constables and 89 Field Tutors. The majority of work with the Probationary Constables is related performance management issues.

A report is provided to the Senior Management Team regarding number of P/C's, the number of Field Tutors and the Field Tutor to Probationary Constable allocation throughout the District. A second report is provided in relation to training compliance throughout the District, broken down into each workgroup.

In addition to corporate training northern District will facilitate training on local issues within the District as identified.

Administration Officers are scheduling IMOST and Dry Drills and data entering training, dry drills and IMOST.

Issues were raised surrounding the role were based around providing training at 3 locations and the 2 training officers having to conduct concurrent training at different locations to cater for all staff due to the insufficient capacity of training facilities.

APPENDIX 5: INVESTIGATION SUPPORT DESK

There are a number of SACAD events that ISD are required to review as part of their SOP.

Figure 1.7 illustrates the SACAD events assessed by ISD. The blue column indicates the number of SACAD events notifications for the month that are required to be reviewed by the ISD. The red column indicates the number that were reviewed by the ISD, with the yellow figure indicating the percentage assessed. As per the Figure 10.1, 73.63% of Grade 1 events were assessed.

A further examination of these Grade 1 Tasks revealed of 74% of Potentially Violent Disturbances, 66% of Domestic Disturbances, 50% of 402, 79.55% of Pursuits were assessed by the ISD.

Of the 44 Events that involved a police pursuit, many that commenced would have been terminated with no avenue for investigation/intel. As a result, 9 of 45 events were not assessed. The figures surrounding the Grade 1 Domestic Disturbances and Potentially Violent Disturbances present more risk.

Figure 1.8 indicates whether advice was given by the ISD or not in relation to events that were assessed by the ISD. The figures between the 2 tables doesn't correlate. This is due to the fact that the "Advice given/not given" table relies on specific user input into the SACAD system where the first table will search based on "ISD" being included within the text. This has been identified as an issue in the reporting of KPI's.

Figure 1.7: February 2019





Figure 1.8: SACAD Events: Advice Given/Not Given Feb 2019



Figures 1.7, 1.9 and 2.0 illustrate SACAD events assessed by the ISD for December 2018 and February 2019. An examination of this 3 month period shows consistent figures in terms of the number and percentage of events assessed.

Figure 1.9: December 2018





Figure 2.0: January 2019



The Grade 1 events present the most organizational risk with not being assessed. Grade 2 events range from 40% - 50% being assessed. Staffing impacts the ability of the ISD to assess events. If fully staffed with no leave or absence there is a Sergeant and 3 Intelligence Officers in the ISD. Like any small workgroup, absence has a large impact on the ability for the ISD to function. 1 team has had a vacancy since inception and as of March 2019, the ISD vacancies increased to 2. On average the number of minutes spent on an event is approximately 50 minutes. The capacity of the ISD is limited. With absence and vacancies there is often 2 Intelligence Officers working on shift.

On given day there are over 2000 SACAD events that are constantly appearing on the screen that the IO's are looking at for events of interest. Figure 2.1 provides an indication of the daily average of ISD events per month. Figure 2.2 illustrates the event types where the ISD are spending their time. Check on Welfare, Domestic Disturbances/Violence and Other Enquiries were the events types where ISD are spending the majority of their time. Figure 2.3 illustrates the average time spent on the different event types.

Figure 2.1




Figure 2.2






Figure 2.3



In addition to the volume of events, the ISD are supposed to only assist members with real time events unless extenuating circumstances exist. The ISD is, however, the after hours intelligence response for SAPOL. The ISD are finding that many requests for Intelligence are being requested by frontline officers that don't relate to current events and during hours when District Intelligence Units should have coverage. Due to the ease in requesting information from the ISD and the lack of coverage by the DIU they will ask the ISD instead. A log has been maintained by the ISD which lists 86 external requests to the ISD as part of their register. Many of the requests logged are not the function of the ISD as per the SOP. Since January 2019, 29 of these requests related to Crimtrac requests, many of which were due to local DIU not being available or the DIU member did not have access. Qualitative data from ISD suggests that intel areas are rarely staffed on afternoon shifts, particularly on Friday, Saturday and Sunday afternoons. This is supported by data obtained from District Intelligence Unit's rosters as detailed under the Crime Co-ordination Section of this report.


A further analysis of the table displaying the hourly average of ISD events that are being assessed by the ISD, as per Figure 2.4, shows a drop between 0300hrs and 0700hrs. An initial proposal when assessing this graph could be that the ISD produce Intelligence Briefings for the Districts on a daily basis relating to pattern crime within the Districts. When the average time spent on an event is 50 minutes and there are generally only 2-3 IO's on duty, reliance to produce any sort of daily document that is relied as part of daily business within the Districts would cause problems if it was not completed due to the ISD running a current event that would take priority. The other factors already stated relating to the identification of these patterns, generally relying on the SACAD system, mean the identification of current pattern crime is limited.

Figure 2.4



There has been a decline in the number of Incident Notification Reports (INR's) being created by the ISD since inception, starting at 89 in July 2018 and seeing a steady decline to 34 in February 2019 as per Figure 10.10. Qualitative information would suggest that this is due to the demand by management for briefing papers as opposed to INR's, meaning managers are opting to provide dot point emails for conversion to Briefing Papers as opposed to INR's.

Figure 2.5



APPENDIX 6: STATE CRIME ASSESSMENT CENTRE (SCAC)

With the introduction of Shield in November 2018, the time to process Crime Occurrences in the new system were significantly longer than under the PIMS environment. Data received from O/C Communications Group suggests the average processing time of an occurrence as opposed to a PIR has increased from 10 min (average) in PIMS to 17.5 min (average) in Shield, representing an increase of 75%. It is anticipated that as both SCAC and frontline members become more proficient in using Shield, these processing times will reduce.

Some of the contributing factors too this increase in processing time can be attributed to:

- High error rates of Shield entries as frontline members continue to learn and become proficient with the new system, along with error rates from the SCAC themselves, creating additional work,
- Additional manual Tasks in Shield that were automated in PIMS, and more comprehensive process flows, links and relationships within the system that require further interrogation, and
- Higher actual volumes of other intakes than those originally provided to the project team.

Data received from Communications Group suggest that the volumes of Occurrences and other reports have increased by 20% above the forecast level. In the first 2 months post the implementation of Shield in November, the number of Crime Occurrences held by the SCAC grew to approximately 1000 (+/- 10%), but settled at this figure for some weeks. The list then reduced to approximately 400 during late December, but quickly returned to 1000+ occurrences, peaked at about 2500 Occurrences in early February and has reduced to about 450 by mid March.

Whilst there has been an increase in the processing time in Shield, an analysis of the rosters of the SCAC over the December and January period revealed 1 team had 5 members on leave for a 1 week period in December with 4 team members on leave for 4 weeks at the same time (Maternity, AL x 2 and LSL) leaving the team with 1 x Sgt + 2 x OR's. Over the same period there were also large number of PDO's taken. During a week in December there were 8 members on leave at the one time and during December there were also a large number of PDO's granted outside of the rostered PDO days. Much of the annual leave taken over this time was leave approved from a previous workplace and honoured at the SCAC. Increased managerial oversight of the SAC may have impacted the amount of leave taken, particularly in relation to PDO's.


Data relating to the average number of Occurrences and Tasks processed by the SCAC was obtained for December and January. Over this period each member had processed approximately 18 Occurrences and 14 Tasks each day over this period.

Taking the average number of Occurrences processed by members, the effect of having 8 members on leave for 5 shifts, has the effect of 720 Occurrences not being completed in that week. Whilst the processing time had increased, the leave and data would indicate that the main reason for the spike in Occurrences was leave related. Since the December/January period leave has reduced and the backlog of Occurrences held by the SCAC reduced from 2500 to about 450, where the SCAC are processing Occurrences in a more timely manner.

The number of Occurrences and Tasks has increased slightly since November last year as per Figure 2.6. The daily average number of Tasks allocated to the SCAC has seen a slight daily increase in Tasks from 410 per day in November, up to 476 as

of mid March. The number of Occurrences has increased by a similar amount. The red line represents the daily number of Occurrences assigned to the SCAC. The blue line represents the daily Tasks.

Figure 11.1: Daily number of Tasks/Occurrences 14/11/18 – 13/3/19



Key Performance Indicators

The KPI's as per the SOP are:

- Priority 1 Police Incident Reports/Crime Occurrences assessed within a 120 minute benchmark.
- Operation Secure – 57 Compliance Check Tasks generated and issued by the SCAC each calendar week.
- Tier 1 Child Abuse Intake raised in Case Management within a 60 minute benchmark.
- Shield flag generated for all Crime Stoppers notifications that relate to firearm possession, where the identity of the person of interest is established.
- Parole Board Warrants entered onto PWIN and allocated as soon as practicable and in every case by the end of shift.

The number of Operations Secure Tasks that are allocated by the SCAC can be audited through Shield. Compliance checks are currently being allocated by Team Support Officers "TSO's" within the SCAC. The remaining KPI's cant be easily determined as per the SOP and do not provide all of the key performance data required to determine whether the SCAC is performing as intended.

Training

At the commencement of the SCAC training was provided to SCAC members, supervisors and DAM members to various degrees. The syllabus of this course covered a workplace induction, workplace coaching, PIMS, Case Management and Shield Training, Acorn, Vehicle ID Examinations, Deaths, Crime Stoppers, Tier 1 Child Abuse, CAD connect and SACAD systems. There was a component under PIMS that related to making judgement and risk assessments.

Officers can laterally transfer into the SCAC and there is no requirement to have completed any course or training or demonstrate suitability for the role. New SCAC members now undertake an induction for 3 days with a senior member when commencing at the SCAC.

Spotdyh Opr to srga or

APPENDIX 7: STATE RESPONSE MANAGER

Role, Function and the SOP

As per the SOP the opening statements for the role of the SRM "has a primary focus on the total State-wide policing environment, providing an 'outward facing' strategic focus on crime events and SAPOL resources on a shift by shift basis"

The SSM has the " primary focus on the total Communications Group call taking environment, providing an 'inward facing' operational focus on Communications Centre, Call Centre and State Crime Assessment Centre operations."

Interviews were conducted with each of the SRM's and SSM in order to conduct the audit of the SOP.

The reference to "inward" and "outward" focus is then confused as the responsibilities of the SSM and the SRM are listed. Numerous functions listed for the SSM and then joint responsibilities have an outward operational focus on resourcing and incidents. For example, the CSM:

- Monitors State-wide dispatch and patrol resource commitments and provides advice to the SRM identifying police resourcing issues within and across District / LSA boundaries to assist with any emergency response demand;
- Commands and manages all pursuit driving incidents throughout the State as Pursuit Commander (PC)
- Maintains liaison with the on duty DDI's to ensure the communication of significant incidents occurring State-wide,
- Maintain liaison with the 'overnight camera person' in relation to incidents of public interest and provide information in accordance with General Order, Media Affairs
- monitor major incidents / events and provide an initial managerial response including mobilization of appropriate resources pending arrival of the Duty Officer (Metropolitan) or LSA On-Call officer (State Operations Service);
- Provides an initial management and coordination responsibility for rescue and other police or emergency events;

Another issue with the inward and outward focus is that many functions overlap resulting in unclear role delineation.

As a result of interviews conducted SSM's, they are completing the following functions in their day to day role. This list is not exhaustive. These functions are consistent with what was occurring pre the SRM implementation.

- Managing pursuits.
- Monitoring events on SACAD.
- Reviewing Grade 1 Taskings.
- Job cancellations.
- Assessing resourcing requirements at events.
- Assessing and managing triangulations.
- Approvals for subscriber checks.
- Remote self harm in custody.
- Recall of IIS.
- Updating the occurrence sheet.

- All roles in the absence of the SRM.

As a result of interviews conducted, SRM's are completing the following functions in their day to day role.

- Monitoring events on SACAD.
- Particular attention is paid to the monitoring pending jobs, the required resources and risk to SAPOL.
- Updating the occurrence sheet.
- All roles in the absence of the SSM.
- Moving resources as required. – In reality this is infrequent.
- Strategic oversight and managing risk to the organisation.

Where SRM's and SSM's function well together, rather than having an "inward" and "outward" focus they work in conjunction to manage events, risk and resources with the main clear delineation being the level of oversight of an event. Where the SSM will provide oversight of an event and the resources required for that event the SRM will be assessing resourcing requirements at a more strategic level. For example if a resource intensive event continues, where are further resources going to be sourced to ensure service delivery is maintained.

Figure 11.2 illustrates the interactions the SSM and SRM have had with SACAD events each month. It should be noted that the SRM should have a more strategic oversight with resources, but does give an indication of the SSM and SRM's involvement in operational events.

SSM / SRM SACAD EVENT INTERACTION AUGUST 2018 - FEBRUARY 2019		
MONTH	SSM	SRM
AUGUST	5401	1018
SEPTEMBER	5362	700
OCTOBER	5644	1330
NOVEMBER	5694	1575
DECEMBER	8039	1023
JANUARY	7793	1041
FEBRUARY	6950	720
AVERAGE P/MONTH	6412	1058

APPENDIX 8

BRIEFING PAPER

SUBJECT: DPM Stage 1 Audit – Methodology

BACKGROUND:

The District Policing Model, Stage 1 was implemented on 5 July 2018. An audit of specific parts of this model was approved in January 2019 by AC BAMFORD and AC DICKSON.

The Terms of Reference of this audit were endorsed by the Operations Program Board on the 11th February 2019.

The scope of this audit was defined by 2 distinct areas:

- 1) An audit of structure and FTE allocation relative to each District, the State Response Manager, the State Crime Assessment Centre and the Investigation Support Desk. Referred to as audit 1.
- 2) An audit of the Standard Operating Procedures for each District Crime Co-ordination Section, and Operations Co-ordination Section, the State Response Manager, the State Crime Assessment Centre and Investigation Support Desk. Referred to as audit 2.

This paper outlines the proposed methodology and task schedule (timeline) that will be adopted to complete this audit, as well the deliverables.

RELEVANT POINTS:

- The DPM Stage 1 was a complex and large scale organisational change, affecting all of MOS and implementing significant changes to Communications Group.
- In order to conduct this audit the following methodology is proposed in order to produce key deliverables. The methodology and key deliverables have been developed in line with the Terms of Reference of this audit.
 - 1) Audit 1: An audit of structure and FTE allocation relative to each District, the State Response Manager, the State Crime Assessment Centre and the Investigation Support Desk.

Methodology:

- a. Engage with HRMB and gather Chris 21 data.
- b. Obtain FTE/Structure approved for implementation.

- c. Conduct a comparative analysis of the data.
- d. Obtain data from District Workforce Planners regarding actual structure.
- e. Where variance is identified speak to Officers in Charge regarding rationale for changes.
- f. Identify data sources within SAPOL systems that can be utilised for analysis. The expertise of a data analyst will enable the harvesting of relevant data sets to either support or negate the rationale for changes as identified in the audit process.
- g. Develop recommendations for report.

Audit 1 - Key Deliverables:

- 1) Actual structures across the Districts/SCAC/ISD/SRM identified and compared to the approved model.
 - 2) Rationale provided by Officers in Charge regarding changes made to structure.
 - 3) Data gathered to support or negate rationale for changes implemented.
 - 4) Recommendations regarding changes to structure/FTE allocation made as a result of the audit.
- 2) Audit 2: An audit of the Standard Operating Procedures for each District Crime Co-ordination Section, and Operations Co-ordination Section, the State Response Manager, the State Crime Assessment Centre and Investigation Support Desk.

Methodology:

- a. Identify stakeholders effected by SOP (employees who have obligations under the SOP).
- b. Commence a consultation log.
- c. Conduct face to face interviews with stakeholders regarding SOP.
- d. Make observations.
- e. Identify data sources within SAPOL systems that can be utilised for analysis. The expertise of a data analyst will enable the harvesting of relevant data sets to either support or negate observations and issues raised as part of the audit process.
- f. Develop recommendations for report.

Audit 2 - Key Deliverables:

- 1) Where employees are not complying with the SOP recommendations may include changes to the SOP to reflect operational reality or employees required to comply with the SOP and provided training, support education etc.
- 2) Where employees are conducting activities/processes outside the SOP recommendations may include amendment to SOP to reflect operational reality or alternatively, the activity/process to cease.

3) Other recommendations relating to the efficient/effective operation of the audited areas.

- A detailed task schedule and timelines reflecting the aforementioned methodology is attached (appendix 1).
- It is proposed the outlined methodology, deliverables and task schedule is reviewed and endorsed by the Project Sponsors. This will ensure the audit outcomes meet the expectations envisaged when developing the Audit Terms of Reference.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. The methodology, task schedule and key deliverables are approved for implementation by Supt John DeCandia.

Approved

Supt John DeCandia
District Policing Model Project Manager
12 February 2019

Contact: Senior Sergeant First Class Angus Yates
Telephone: 0422808176
Ref: PCO TBA
Date: 12th February 20

Submitted for
approval

APPENDIX 1A: SOUTHERN DISTRICT STRUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION

****Restricted duties are included as vacancies – this however, does not mean they are not completing meaningful work within the District****

MOS STAFFING AND STRUCTURE ON THE 22/2/2019														
District/Service		Secondments In/OE (FTE)	Vacancies (FTE)	Long Term Absentees (FTE)	Restricted (FTE)	Secondments Out (FTE)	FTE lost to Part Time	TOTAL VACANCIES (FTE) - OE/Secondm ents in	TOTAL SWORN/UN SWORN (FTE)	FTE as per DPM SI (SSO changes made)	Difference DPM vs Staffing Report	Changes to Structure	% OF MEMBERS AVAILABLE (FTE)	Part Time (FTE)
SD	TOTAL (FTE)	61.60	8.00	21.80	24.40	26.60	7.53	26.73	449.00	449.00	0.00		94.05%	30.50
	SD Business	2.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00		0.00	22.00	22.00	0.00		100.00%	1.70
	SD Management	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD District Teams Chri	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	9.00	9.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Ops Coordinator Stur	0.00	0.00	2.00	4.80	0.00		6.80	14.00	14.00	0.00	1.00	51.43%	1.30
	SD Ops Manager Aldi	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Ops Manager Chri	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Ops Manager Netl	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Ops Manager Stur	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Response Teams Aldi	5.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	2.00		0.00	24.00	24.00	0.00		100.00%	1.20
	SD Response Teams Chri	11.20	0.00	2.00	1.00	5.00		-3.20	63.00	63.00	0.00	-4.00	105.68%	3.20
	SD Response Teams Netl	9.00	1.00	0.60	3.00	5.00		0.60	71.00	71.00	0.00	-1.00	99.15%	0.00
	SD Response Teams Stur	26.40	0.00	5.60	1.60	4.60		-14.60	72.00	72.00	0.00	-4.00	120.28%	4.10
	SD Station Aldi	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.60	0.00		1.60	2.00	2.00	0.00		20.00%	0.60
	SD Station Chri	0.40	0.00	0.60	2.00	1.60		3.80	11.00	11.00	0.00		65.45%	2.60
	SD Station Netl	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	2.00	2.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Station Stur	6.60	1.00	1.00	3.00	0.00		-1.60	10.00	10.00	0.00		116.00%	5.20
	SD Custody Chri	0.00	6.00	0.00	1.00	0.00		7.00	15.00	15.00	0.00		53.33%	2.20
	SD Duty Inspectors	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD CIB Ops Insp Chri	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Child Family Inv Chri	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.80	0.60		3.40	31.00	31.00	0.00	2.00	89.03%	5.60
	SD CIB Inv Chri	0.00	0.00	6.00	2.00	3.80		11.80	37.00	37.00	0.00		68.11%	2.20
	SD Crime Coord HSM Chri	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.60	0.00		0.60	2.00	2.00	0.00		70.00%	0.00
	SD Crime Coord Int Chri	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00		0.00	10.00	10.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	SD Crime Coord Chri	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	6.00	6.00	0.00		100.00%	0.60
	SD CIB Tact Chri	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	2.00		3.00	37.00	37.00	0.00		91.89%	0.00
											Shops Marion	2.00		
											Shops Collon	2.00		
											CC's	5.00		

SOUTHERN DISTRICT - SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO STRUCTURE

Community Constables

2 x Community Constables in OE positions.

2 x Response members in OE positions as partners. Both sworn members from Sturt Response.

1 x Community Constable in Aldinga Station on Restricted duties in an OE position.

Internal Secondments

Shopping Centre Patrols

2 x Sturt Response permanently working in Westfield Marion Shopping Centre. To be returned.

2 x members in OE positions working permanently in Collonades Shopping Centre. To be returned to Christies Beach Response. Members are in OE positions.

13 Internal secondments. 4 to staff the shopping centre patrols as above. Others include secondments into CC positions.

CFIS Allocations and Investigations **6 month trial**

- 2 x GD Response OE to CFIS as Allocations and Assessment

Missing Persons

1 x Netley Response Member, OE position.

Effect of Part time

21.47 FTE used for 29 positions = loss of 7.53 FTE,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT APPROVED STRUTCURE (Amendments made for changes to Stations)

DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	APPROVED AS PER DPM STAGE 1													
			SUPT	C/IN	INSP	S>	SGT	S/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total
SOUTHERN	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1									1	
		Planning					1		1						2	
		BQCO					1		3						4	
		Crime Prevention					1		3						4	
		Missing Persons							3						3	
		Training and RPCC							2						0	14
	PATROLS	Christies Beach				1	5	5	53						64	
		Sturt				1	6	6	60						73	
		Netley				1	6	6	59						72	
		Aldinga				1	5	0	19						25	
		Community Constables													0	234
	NPT's	Christies Beach					1		8						9	
		Sturt													0	
		Netley													0	
		Aldinga													0	9
	POLICE STATION	Christies Beach					2		9					6	17	
		Sturt					3	3	4					3	13	
		Netley							2					1	3	
		Aldinga							2						2	35
	CUSTODY	Christies Beach					5	5	5						15	15
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	3	33							37	
		Volume Crime				1	3	14	19						37	
		Child and Family				1	3	10	17						31	105
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1									1	
		District Allocation							3						3	
		Victim Contact							2						2	
		HSMLD						1	2						3	
		Intelligence					1	6				1		1	9	18
	NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Enquiries														
		Property														
	TOTAL		1	2	4	9	46	89	276	0	1	2	2	19	449	449

SOUTHERN DISTRICT ACTUAL STRUCTURE ON THE 11/2/2019

OE, Vacancies, Secondments in/out, Long Term Absence, Part time have been calculated by Workforce Planners to indicate the FTE under each rank. There is some slight discrepancy in total numbers as at this time changes had not been made to Chris 21 to reflect the changes. This is an indication only on this date as staffing fluctuates

DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	Actual District Staffing Structure													
			SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/COMS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total
SOUTHERN	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1									1	
		Planning					1		1						2	
		BQCO					1		3						4	
		Crime Prevention					1		3						4	
		Missing Persons							4						4	
		Training and RPCC													0	15
	PATROLS	Christies Beach				1	4	5	53						63	
		Sturt				1	6	6	59	2					74	
		Netley				1	5	4	59						69	
		Aldinga				1	5		19						25	
		Community Constables													0	231
	NPT's	Christies Beach					1		8						9	
		Sturt													0	
		Netley													0	
		Aldinga													0	9
	POLICE STATION	Christies Beach					2		9	0.63					12	
		Sturt					3	2	4						9	
		Netley							2							
		Aldinga							2						2	23
	CUSTODY	Christies Beach					5	5	5						15	15
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	3	32.5							37	
		Volume Crime				1	3	14	19						37	
		Child and Family				1	3	9.4	18						32	106
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1	1								2	
		District Allocation							3						3	
		Victim Contact							2						2	
		HSMLO						2	1						3	
	NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Intelligence							6				1	1	8	18
		Enquiries													0	
		Property													0	
															0	
															0	0
	TOTAL		1	2	4	9	44	79.9	280	2.63	1	2	3	13	441	441

APPENDIX 1B: EASTERN DISTRICT STRUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION

****Restricted duties are included as vacancies – this however, does not mean they are not completing meaningful work within the District****

MOS STAFFING AND STRUCTURE ON THE 22/2/2019														
District/Service		Secondments In/OE (FTE)	Vacancies (FTE)	Long Term Absentees (FTE)	Restricted (FTE)	Secondments Out (FTE)	FTE lost to Part Time	TOTAL VACANCIES (FTE) - OE/Secondm ents in	TOTAL SWORN/UN SWORN (FTE)	FTE as per DPM S1 (SSO changes made)	Difference DPM vs Staffing Report	Changes to Structure	% OF MEMBERS AVAILABLE (FTE)	Part Time (FTE)
ED	TOTAL (FTE)	51.52	15.50	24.63	26.10	18.26	6.50	39.47	442.00	442.00	0.00		91.07%	21.50
	ED Business	1.00	2.50	1.00	0.00	0.00		2.50	25.00	25.00	0.00		90.00%	1.30
	ED Management	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED District Teams Gren	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		#21/01	0.00
	ED District Teams Hold	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00		1.00	5.00	5.00	0.00		80.00%	0.00
	ED Ops Coordinator Gren	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00		1.00	14.00	14.00	0.00		92.86%	1.68
	ED Ops Manager Hind	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED Ops Manager Gren	1.00	0.00	2.00	0.00	0.00		1.00	5.00	9.00	4.00		80.00%	0.00
	ED Ops Manager Hold	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED Ops Manager Norw	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED Response Teams Hind	1.00	0.00	2.00	0.00	2.00		3.00	56.00	56.00	0.00	-1.00	91.44%	3.09
	ED Response Teams Gren	3.63	1.00	4.00	1.00	2.63		5.00	62.00	61.00	-1.00	-2.00	91.94%	0.63
	ED Response Teams Hold	7.00	1.00	4.00	2.00	2.00		2.00	55.00	55.00	0.00	-2.00	96.36%	1.68
	ED Response Teams Norw	12.84	0.00	1.00	0.00	3.00		-8.84	43.00	43.00	0.00	-4.00	120.56%	2.42
	ED Station Hind	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		2.00	7.00	7.00	0.00		71.43%	1.58
	ED Station Gren	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00	0.00		2.00	10.00	10.00	0.00	1.00	80.00%	0.00
	ED Station Hold	15.21	4.00	3.63	6.47	1.63		0.52	11.00	11.00	0.00	-2.63	95.27%	4.83
	ED Station Norw	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00	0.00		2.00	4.00	4.00	0.00		50.00%	0.00
	ED Custody CWH	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	0.00		6.00	25.00	25.00	0.00		76.00%	0.00
	ED Duty Inspectors	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED CIB Ops Insp Gren	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED Child Family Inv Gren	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	0.00		2.00	21.00	21.00	0.00		90.48%	2.43
	ED CIB Inv Gren	1.00	0.00	0.00	2.63	6.00		7.63	34.00	34.00	0.00		77.56%	1.26
	ED Crime Coord HSM Gren	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	2.00	2.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	ED Crime Coord Int Gren	1.64	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00		2.16	10.00	10.00	0.00	1.00	78.40%	0.60
	ED Crime Coord Gren	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		1.00	6.00	6.00	0.00		83.33%	0.00
	ED CIB Tact Gren	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00		1.00	37.00	34.00	-3.00		97.30%	0.00
											Property	3.63		
											Op Paragon	9.00		

EASTERN DISTRICT - SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO STRUCTURE

Operation Paragon

1 SGT and 8 x Response internally seconded to Operation Paragon.

Holden Hill Property

3 x OR (2.63FTE) internally seconded to Holden Hill Property

Grenfell St Property

1 x OR internally seconded to Grenfell St Property

**Eastern District contacted since the initial Audit: As of the 9th April 2019, 1 x FTE at Holden Hill Property, 1 x FTE lost to Southern Property Store, with 1 further position to be lost to the Southern Property store when Holden Hill Property is closed and transitions to Southern Property Store. Estimated to occur around June 2019. **

Eastern District Intelligence & DAM

1 x OE Sgt working in Eastern District Crime Coordination, 1 x OE Sgt working in the Eastern District DAM.

Internal secondments

- 27 Total internal secondments.
- 10 are for the above changes in Structure.
- The remaining 17 relate to filling vacancies internally within the district.

Effect of Part time

21.5 FTE used for 28 positions = loss of 6.5 FTE, 5.4 FTE are Response positions.

Enquiries Allocation

Each team is responsible for conducting enquiries allocated to their specific area. There is no one enquiries member. All enquiries are spread across the team to manage.

EASTERN DISTRICT APPROVED STRUTCURE (Amendments made for changes to Stations)

DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	APPROVED AS PER DPM STAGE 1													
			SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total
EASTERN	MNG & SUPPORT		1	2	4						1	1	2	8	19	19
	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1									1	
		Planning					1		1						2	
		BQCO					1		3						4	
		Crime Prevention					1		3						4	
		Missing Persons							3						3	
		Training and RPCC							2						0	14
	PATROLS	Hindley Street				1	7	7	42						57	
		Holden Hill				1	5	5	45						56	
		Norwood				1	6	6	31						44	
		Grenfell Street				1	7	7	47						62	
		Community Constables							4	4					8	227
	NPT's	Hindley Street													0	
		Holden Hill					1		4						5	
		Norwood													0	
		Grenfell Street													0	5
	POLICE STATION	Hindley Street							7					2	9	
		Holden Hill					3	3	5					2	13	
		Norwood					1		3					5	9	
		Grenfell Street					1		10					3	14	45
	CUSTODY	CWH					5	5	15						25	25
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	3	30							34	
		Volume Crime				1	3	9	21						34	
		Child and Family				1	3	6	11						21	89
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1									1	
		District Allocation							3						3	
		Victim Contact							2						2	
		HSMLO						1	2						3	
		Intelligence					1	6				1		1	9	18
	NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Enquiries														
		Property														
	TOTAL		1	2	4	9	49	85	264	4	1	2	2	21	442	442

EASTERN DISTRICT ACTUAL STRUCTURE ON THE 11/2/2019

OE, Vacancies, Secondments in/out, Long Term Absence, Part time have been calculated by Workforce Planners to indicate the FTE under each rank. There is some slight discrepancy in total numbers as at this time changes had not been made to Chris 21 to reflect the changes. This is an indication only on this date as staffing fluctuates

			Actual District Staffing Structure														
DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total	
EASTERN	MNG & SUPPORT		0	2	5						1	1	2	18.3	29.3	29.3	
	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1									1		
		Planning					1			1						2	
		BQCO					1			2.84						3.84	
		Crime Prevention					1			2						3	
		Missing Persons								3						3	
		Training and RPCC					2									2	12.84
	PATROLS	Hindley Street				1	5.63	7	41.46							55.09	
		Holden Hill				1	5	3	42.68							51.68	
		Norwood				1	5	6	33.76							45.76	
		Grenfell Street				1	7	6	40.63							54.63	
		Community Constables								3	3					6	213.16
	NPT's	Hindley Street														0	
		Holden Hill						1		4						5	
		Norwood														0	
		Grenfell Street														0	5
	POLICE STATION	Hindley Street								5.58						5.58	
		Holden Hill						2		10.57						12.57	
		Norwood						1		6.4						7.4	
		Grenfell Street						1		8						9	34.55
	CUSTODY	CWH					4	3	17.42							24.42	24.42
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response						3	24.26							27.26	
		Volume Crime				1	3	9	21							34	
		Child and Family				1	3	7	12.43							23.43	84.69
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				2										2	
		District Allocation					1			2						3	
		Victim Contact								2						2	
		HSMLO							2							2	
		Intelligence					1	4.8	1.84				0.6		1	9.24	18.24
	NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Enquiries														0	
		Property								3.63						3.63	
							1			8						9	
										1						1	13.63
	TOTAL			0	2	5	9	43.63	72.06	274.24	3	1	1.6	2	19.3	435.83	435.83

APPENDIX 1C: NORTHERN DISTRICT STRUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION

****Restricted duties are included as vacancies – this however, does not mean they are not completing meaningful work within the District****

MOS STAFFING AND STRUCTURE ON THE 22/2/2019															
District/Service		Secondments In/OE (FTE)	Vacancies (FTE)	Long Term Absentees (FTE)	Restricted (FTE)	Secondments Out (FTE)	FTE lost to Part Time	TOTAL VACANCIES (FTE) - OE/Secondm ents in	TOTAL SWORN/UN SWORN (FTE)	FTE as per DPM S1 (SSO changes made)	Difference DPM vs Staffing Report	Changes to Structure	% OF MEMBERS AVAILABLE (FTE)	Part Time (FTE)	
ND	TOTAL (FTE)	29.60	17.00	13.69	18.40	13.30	4.66	37.45	479.00	479.00	0.00		92.18%	13.34	
	ND Business	0.00	0.00	0.80	0.00	1.00		1.80	20.00	20.00	0.00		91.00%	0.00	
	ND Management	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	1.89	
	ND District Teams Eliz	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	5.00	5.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND District Teams Sali	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	1.00	100.00%	0.00	
	ND Ops Coordinator Sali	1.00	0.00	1.00	3.40	1.00		4.40	16.00	14.00	-2.00		72.50%	3.90	
	ND Ops Manager Eliz	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND Ops Manager Gold	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND Ops Manager Sali	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		-1.00	4.00	7.00	3.00		125.00%	0.00	
	ND Response Teams Eliz	15.00	2.00	0.00	3.00	1.00		-9.00	86.00	86.00	0.00	-1.00	110.47%	0.00	
	ND Response Teams Gold	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		3.00	74.00	74.00	0.00		95.95%	1.00	
	ND Response Teams Sali	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.70		5.70	85.00	84.00	-1.00	-2.00	93.29%	0.70	
	ND Station Eliz	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.70	0.60		2.30	13.00	13.00	0.00	-1.00	82.31%	0.80	
	ND Station Gold	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	2.00	2.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND Station Sali	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00		1.00	2.00	2.00	0.00		50.00%	0.00	
	ND Custody Eliz	0.00	5.00	1.00	0.00	0.00		6.00	26.00	26.00	0.00	-2.00	76.92%	0.00	
	ND Duty Inspectors	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND CIB Ops Insp Eliz	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND Child Family Inv Eliz	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00		5.00	37.00	37.00	0.00		86.49%	1.86	
	ND CIB Inv Eliz	0.00	1.00	1.89	0.00	4.00		6.89	40.00	40.00	0.00		82.78%	1.29	
	ND Crime Coord HSM Eliz	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	2.00	2.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00	
	ND Crime Coord Int Eliz	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		1.00	10.00	10.00	0.00		90.00%	0.00	
	ND Crime Coord Eliz	2.60	0.00	1.00	2.30	0.00		0.70	6.00	6.00	0.00		88.33%	1.90	
	ND CIB Tact Eliz	0.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00		5.00	37.00	37.00	0.00		86.49%	0.00	
												Property	5.00		
												CC's	2.00		

NORTHERN DISTRICT - SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO STRUCTURE

Property

- 5 x seconded to Property.
- 1 x Elizabeth Response.
- 1 x Salisbury Response.
- 2 x Elizabeth Custody.
- 1 x OE position.

Enquiries

Salisbury Response - Allocate 1 member from each Team.

Golden Grove - Allocate 1 member from each team.

Elizabeth - Allocate 1 member from each team + 1x Elizabeth Station Member who conducts Intervention Order enquiries and covers absences.

Enquiries work alongside their allocated Response Team. There are some Flexible Working Arrangements.

Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT)

1 x OE position used to cover suburb of Para Hills. Member from Salisbury Response. NPT area inherited under DPM change in boundaries.

Community Constables

1 x Community Constable extra in an OE position.

1 x Response member position lost for a sworn partner.

Northern District DAM

1 x OE Sgt and 1.63FTE extra staff OE.

Effect of Part time

21.5 FTE used for 28 positions = loss of 6.5 FTE, 5.4 FTE are Response positions.

NORTHERN DISTRICT APPROVED STRUTCURE (Amendments made for changes to Stations)

			APPROVED AS PER DPM STAGE 1														
DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASD 5	ASD 4	ASD 3	ASD 2	TOTAL	Area Total	
NORTHERN	MNG & SUPPORT		1	2	4						1	1	2	8	19	19	
	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1										1	
		Planning					1			1						2	
		BQCO					1			3						4	
		Crime Prevention					1			3						4	
		Missing Persons								3						3	
		Training and RPCC								2						0	14
	PATROLS	Elizabeth				1	6	6	74							87	
		Salisbury				1	6	6	72							85	
		Golden Grove				1	5	5	64							75	
		Community Constables							3	3						6	253
	NPT's	Elizabeth					1		4							5	
		Salisbury					1		4							5	
		Golden Grove														0	10
	POLICE STATION	Elizabeth					3		10						6	19	
		Salisbury							2						1	3	
		Golden Grove							2						1	3	25
	CUSTODY	Elizabeth					6	5	15							26	26
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	3	36								40	
		Volume Crime				1	3	12	21							37	
		Child and Family				1	3	12	21							37	114
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1										1	
		District Allocation								3						3	
		Victim Contact								2						2	
		HSMLO							2							2	
		Intelligence					1	7					1		1	10	18
	OTHER NOT IN DPM 51 STRUCTURE	Enquiries															
Property																	
TOTAL			1	2	4	8	41	91	309	3	1	2	2	17	479	479	

NORTHERN DISTRICT ACTUAL STRUCTURE ON THE 11/2/2019

OE, Vacancies, Secondments in/out, Long Term Absence, Part time have been calculated by Workforce Planners to indicate the FTE under each rank. There is some slight discrepancy in total numbers as at this time changes had not been made to Chris 21 to reflect the changes. This is an indication only on this date as staffing fluctuates

			Actual District Staffing Structure														
DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total	
NORTHERN	MNG & SUPPORT		1	2	4						1	1	2	7	18	18	
	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1									1		
		Planning					2								2		
		BQCO					1		2						3		
		Crime Prevention					1		3.10						4.1		
		Missing Persons							4						4		
		Training and RPCC													0	14.1	
	PATROLS	Elizabeth				1	5	6	80						92		
		Salisbury				1	6	5	68						80		
		Golden Grove				1	5	5	61.05					1	73.05		
		Community Constables								4					4	249.05	
	NPT's	Elizabeth					1		4						5		
		Salisbury					1		5						6		
		Golden Grove														11	
	POLICE STATION	Elizabeth					1		7.8						6	14.8	
		Salisbury							2						0.6	2.6	
		Golden Grove							2						1	3	20.4
	CUSTODY	Elizabeth					5	2	12						19	19	
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	2	24.33								27.33	
		Volume Crime				1	2	10	19							32	
		Child and Family				1	1	12.37	18.56							32.93	92.26
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1										1	
		District Allocation					1		4.63							5.63	
		Victim Contact							1							1	
		HSMLO						3								3	
		Intelligence					1	5					1		1	8	18.63
OTHER NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Enquiries								7						7		
	Property								5						5		
															0		
															0	12	
TOTAL			1	2	4	8	35	72.7	306.14	4	1	2	2	16.6	454.44	454.44	

APPENDIX 1D: WESTERN DISTRICT STRUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION

****Restricted duties are included as vacancies – this however, does not mean they are not completing meaningful work within the District****

MOS STAFFING AND STRUCTURE ON THE 22/2/2019														
District/Service		Secondments In/OE (FTE)	Vacancies (FTE)	Long Term Absentees (FTE)	Restricted (FTE)	Secondments Out (FTE)	FTE lost to Part Time	TOTAL VACANCIES (FTE) - OE/Secondm ents in	TOTAL SWORN/UN SWORN (FTE)	FTE as per DPM S1 (SSO changes made)	Difference DPM vs Staffing Report	Changes to Structure	% OF MEMBERS AVAILABLE (FTE)	Part Time (FTE)
WD	TOTAL (FTE)	17.00	13.00	17.40	11.60	14.30	3.50	42.80	445.00	445.00	0.00		90.38%	19.10
	WD Business	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00		2.00	23.00	23.00	0.00		91.30%	0.80
	WD Management	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD District Teams Park	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	4.00	100.00%	0.00
	WD Ops Coordinator Park	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00		1.00	16.00	14.00	-2.00		93.75%	0.00
	WD Ops Manager Henl	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD Ops Manager Park	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00		0.00	4.00	7.00	3.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD Ops Manager Port	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		0.00%	0.00
	WD Response Teams Henl	6.00	3.00	6.40	1.80	0.80		6.00	74.00	74.00	0.00	-1.00	91.89%	4.40
	WD Response Teams Park	4.00	2.00	0.00	3.00	1.00		2.00	73.00	72.00	-1.00	-3.00	97.26%	0.00
	WD Response Teams Port	4.00	0.00	1.40	2.00	3.00		2.40	75.00	75.00	0.00	-3.00	96.80%	1.90
	WD Station Glen	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	2.00	3.00	1.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD Station Henl	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	4.00	5.00	1.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD Station Port	0.00	3.00	1.00	0.00	0.00		4.00	14.00	12.00	-2.00	-1.00	71.43%	0.00
	WD Custody Port	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00		2.00	15.00	15.00	0.00		86.67%	0.00
	WD Duty Inspectors	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		-1.00	3.00	3.00	0.00		133.33%	0.00
	WD CIB Ops Insp Port	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD Child Family Inv Port	0.00	1.00	3.60	0.00	2.50		7.10	26.00	26.00	0.00	1.00	72.69%	6.00
	WD CIB Inv Port	0.00	2.00	1.00	2.80	0.00		5.80	34.00	34.00	0.00		82.94%	0.80
	WD Crime Coord HSM Port	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	2.00	2.00	0.00		100.00%	0.00
	WD Crime Coord Int Port	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00	0.00		2.00	10.00	10.00	0.00		80.00%	2.40
	WD Crime Coord Port	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	6.00	6.00	0.00		100.00%	2.00
	WD CIB Tact Port	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	4.00		5.00	53.00	53.00	0.00	-5.00	90.57%	0.80
											Property	3.00		
											CC's	1.00		
MOS TOTALS		159.72	53.50	77.52	80.50	72.46	22.19	146.45	1815.00	1815.00			91.93%	84.44

WESTERN DISTRICT - SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO STRUCTURE

NPT Expansion

4 x VCT members to NPT's. These were to cover the NPT areas previously covered by Holden Hill that became part of the Western District under the DPM.

4 x Response members rotating on a 10 weekly basis to add a further 4 to the NPT. (2 x Parks Response, 1 x Henley Response, 1 x Port Response). These members are generally P/C's and it is to proactively police NPT areas that have been subject to high volume crime.

Property

3 x seconded into Property.

- 1 x Port Station OR

- 1 x Port Response OR.

Community Constables

1 x Community Constable in an OE position.

1 x Response member position lost for a sworn partner.

CFIS

1 x GD position from VCT to CFIS to even the team numbers.

Enquiries

Parks Response - Allocate 1 member from each Team.

Henley Response - Allocate 1 member from each team.

Port Response - Allocate 1 member from each team

Enquiries work alongside their allocated Response Team. There are some Flexible Working Arrangements.

Internal Secondments

3 internal secondments.

Effect of Part time

18.5FTE used for 22 position = 3.5 FTE lost.

WESTERN DISTRICT APPROVED STRUTCURE (Amendments made for changes to Stations)

DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	APPROVED AS PER DPM STAGE 1													
			SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total
WESTERN	MMG & SUPPORT		1	2	4						1	1	2	8	19	19
	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1									1	
		Planning					1		1						2	
		BQCO					1		3						4	
		Crime Prevention					1		3						4	
		Missing Persons							3						3	
		Training and RPCC							2						0	14
	PATROLS	Port Adelaide				1	5	5	65						76	
		Parks				1	5	5	62						73	
		Henley Beach				1	5	5	64						75	
		Community Constables							3	3					6	230
	NPT's	Port Adelaide													0	
		Parks					1		4						5	
		Henley Beach													0	5
	POLICE STATION	Port Adelaide					3		9					7	19	
		Glenslg							3					1	4	
		Henley Beach					1		4					3	8	31
	CUSTODY	Port Adelaide					5	5	5						15	15
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	3	30							34	
		Volume Crime				1	4	14	34						53	
		Child and Family				1	3	8	14						26	113
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1									1	
		District Allocation							3						3	
		Victim Contact							2						2	
		HSMLO						1	2						3	
		Intelligence					1	6				1		1	9	18
	NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Enquiries														
		Property														
	TOTAL		1	2	4	8	39	79	286	3	1	2	2	20	445	445

NORTHERN DISTRICT ACTUAL STRUCTURE ON THE 11/2/2019

****OE, Vacancies, Secondments in/out, Long Term Absence, Part time have been calculated by Workforce Planners to indicate the FTE under each rank. There is some slight discrepancy in total numbers as at this time changes had not been made to Chris 21 to reflect the changes. This is an indication only on this date as staffing fluctuates****

			Actual District Staffing Structure														
DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	SUPT	C/JIN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total	
WESTERN	MING & SUPPORT		1	2	4						1	1	2	3	14	14	
	OPERATIONS COORDINATION	Operations Co-ordination				1										1	
		Planning						1		2						3	
		BQCO						1		3						4	
		Crime Prevention						1		2						3	
		Missing Persons								3						3	
		Training and RPCC						2								2	16
	PATROLS	Port Adelaide				1	5	5	54.9							65.9	
		Parks				1	5	5	50							61	
		Henley Beach				1	6	5	54.2							66.2	
		Community Constables								4	4					8	201.1
	NPT's	Port Adelaide														0	
		Parks						1		12						13	
		Henley Beach														0	13
	POLICE STATION	Port Adelaide						3		10.2					6	19.2	
		Glenelg								3					2	5	
		Henley Beach						1		3.6					3	7.6	31.8
	CUSTODY	Port Adelaide					5	5	5						15	15	
	CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH	CIB Response				1	3	27.8							0.8	32.6	
		Volume Crime				1	4	10	28							43	
		Child and Family				2	3	6.7	13.7						1	26.4	102
	CRIME COORDINATION	Crime Co-ordination				1									1	2	
		District Allocation								2.8						2.8	
		Victim Contact								2.2						2.2	
		HSMLO							2.8							2.8	
		Intelligence						1	5.65				1		1	8.65	18.45
	NOT IN DPM S1 STRUCTURE	Enquiries								14.5						14.5	
Property									3						3		
															0		
															0	17.5	
	TOTAL		1	2	4	9	42	72.35	271.1	4	1	2	2	17.8	428.85	428.85	

APPENDIX 2A:

STUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION OF THE STATE RESPONSE MANAGER, STATE CRIME ASSESSMENT CENTRE AND INVESTIGATION SUPPORT DESK ON THE 11th FEBRUARY 2019.

			APPROVED AS PER DPM STAGE 1													
DISTRICT	WORK GROUP	POSITION	SUPT	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	B/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total
COMMS	SCAC						5	5	25					4	39	
	ISD						5		15						20	
	SRM			6											6	

STUCTURE AND FTE ALLOCATION OF THE STATE RESPONSE MANAGER, STATE CRIME ASSESSMENT CENTRE AND INVESTIGATION SUPPORT DESK ON THE 11th FEBRUARY 2019.

		Actual District Staffing Structure																			
DISTRICT	WDRK GROUP	C/IN	INSP	SSGT	SGT	E/SGT	SC/CONS	CC	ASO 5	ASO 4	ASO 3	ASO 2	TOTAL	Area Total	VACANT	OE	LT ABS	PT TIME	SECOND INTERNAL	SECOND EXTERNAL	REST DUT
COMMS	SCAC				6	5	25.6					3	39.6		1	3	2	6			
	ISD				5		14						19		1						
	SRM	5											5								1

State Response Manager:

1 x SRM on Secondment to the MAC. SRM have also had a long term absence due to sickness since inception but had returned when the audit conducted.

ISD

1 x vacancy at the time of the audit. Another position has since become vacant. Comcen operators were have not been utilised as "logistics officers."

SCAC

At the time of the audit (11/2/19) the SCAC had 1 x OE Sergeant. Effective utilisation of Part Time positions and no vacancies meant they had 25.6 FTE. Communications Group were contacted in April. 5 x SC/Cons had been seconded into the SCAC in OE positions for a 6 month period.

